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I. INTRODUCTION 
The case against allowing corporations to indemnify directors for 
amounts directors pay to settle derivative litigation appears overwhelm-
ing. The logic against indemnification is circularity of recovery--the 
corporation returns the recovered amounts to the wrongdoer and, after 
paying its own expenses and those of the plaintiff, is invariably a net 
loser. The case and logic against indemnification is persuasive to the 
vast majority of the states, including Delaware, and to 'the drafters of 
both the American Bar Association Model Business Corporation Act 
("Model Act")1 and the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Govemance.2 The intuitive reaction of a sophisticated nonlawyer 
observer is even more decided--allowing a suit in which an acceptable 
outcome of a successful suit is a net loss for the plaintiff and a wash for 
the defendant is akin to setting- up a system for lawyers to pursue 
lawsuits without plaintiffs.3 
The little scrutinized legal bar on such indemnification rests within a 
system for litigation to redress directorial misconduct that is heavily 
1. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association, which 
developed the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. 1994) ("Model Act"), recently 
adopted revisions to the provisions for indemnification and advance for expenses of the 
Model Act. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Indemnification and Advance for Expenses, 
49 Bus. LAW. 741, 741 (1994) (proposed amendments); Committee on Corporate Laws, 
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to 
Indemnification and Advance for Expenses, 49 Bus. LAW. 1823, 1823 (1994) (final 
adoption). 
The Committee publishes the Model Act not merely as a persuasive model for 
comparison but as law which many state legislatures substantially enact into their state 
corporation codes. Elliott Goldstein, CORPRO: A Committee That Became an 
Institution, 48 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1334 (1994); see also DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE§ 6:37 (1994) (stating that 
many states have indemnification statutes drawn from the Model Act and the Revised 
Model Act). 
The changes deserve careful scrutiny because of their probable influence on state 
code provisions governing indemnification, the importance to public corporations of the 
provisions protecting directors from large unreimbursed personal liabilities, and the 
unusual complexity of the subject. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra, at 749 
(referring to provisions for indemnification and advance of expenses as "among the most 
complex and important in the entire Act"). 
2. Members of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance, Project (ALI) 
created and adopted THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATiONS (Proposed Final Draft Mar. 31, 
1992)[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE]. These principles differ from the case of 
the Model Act, which .state legislatures often enact into state corporate law. See 
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1334 (describing the Corporate Governance Project). 
3. Interview with David Lapin, CPCU; Vice President, Underwriting, Executive 
Risk Indemnity, Inc., in Detroit, Michigan (Jan. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Interview]. 
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criticized as driven by perverse incentives.4 For the most part, commen-
tary on the system of corporate litigation takes for granted the fundamen-
tal institutional factors that drive lawsuits brought on behalf of investors. 
Policy evaluations of such litigation are derived from a premise of an 
atomized moral climate--self-protecting boards,5 greedy lawyers,6 
passive shareholders,7 and profit-oriented insurance companies that 
control funds which make attractive targets for lawsuits.8 Despite the 
ferment apparent in recent proposals for new rules and even new legal 
entities to alter the "market mechanisms" for corporate litigation,9 
4. The mildest descriptions of the shortcomings of derivative litigation are 
fundamental to the understanding of the remedy. They simply allude to the possibilities 
of abuse. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 712 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994) (citing 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 7.40-7.47 introductory cmt. at 195 (1991) for 
proposition that derivative action is susceptible to abuse). See generally John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985). 
The negative assessment of the usefulness of derivative suits has intensified in recent 
years in academic writing and in the popular press. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Paying 
Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of 
Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 949 (1993) (stating that there is increasing 
evidence that derivative suits (and class actions) substantially diminish the return to 
investors in American companies); see also Dan Cordtz & Jennifer Reingold, The 
Vanishing Director Lawsuits, Angry Shareholders and Public Criticism Make Board 
Duty Unpopular, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 12, 1993, at 22 (referring to potential directors' 
well-founded fear of being hauled into court by some disgruntled shareholder). 
5. James D. Cox, Searching/or the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Litigation: 
A Critique a/Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (describing use of 
"special litigation committees" by boards of directors to, invariably, recommend 
dismissal of derivative suits). 
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law 
Institute Faces the Derivative Action; Symposium of Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. 
LAW. 1407, 1429 n.81 (1993) (noting negative view of idea of"entrepreneurial" lawyers 
not constrained by clients); id. at 1436 (referring to clearcut evidence of settlements of 
little benefit to shareholders but very lucrative for plaintiffs' lawyers). 
7. Id.; see also Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board 
in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 
Bus. LAW. 503, 520 (1989) (describing statutory rationale for relegating shareholders to 
a passive role). 
8. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 560-64 (1991) (discussing strategic 
considerations of insurance companies in providing insurance and funding settlements).· 
9. Both the 103d Congress and the current 104th Congress saw the introduction 
of bills intended to trim the extent of corporate litigation in the context of securities class 
actions. Many of the areas of policy change concern alteration of the incentives that 
drive this type of corporate litigation. For a summary of the bill introduced in 1994 by 
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fundamental assumptions about the moral climate that underlies the 
ground rules for corporate litigation, including the indemnification bar, 
are mostly intact in the literature. The rationale for the bar, and the 
possible arguments for removing it, deserve a concentrated examination 
that they have not received, not only for the possibility of altering policy 
but also for the insights into the practical differences between the 
predominant system of resolving derivative suits and its possible 
extension (through more liberal indemnification). 
A. Summary of Argument 
This Article presents the case for permitting boards to settle cases by 
allowing a director to acknowledge liability, pay a sum of money to the 
corporation, and receive its prompt return from the corporation. To see 
the question as clearly as possible, the crassest statement of the 
procedure should be set forth. The corporate board, which universally 
opposes derivative litigation, would be allowed to end a lawsuit by 
bribing the lawyers for the shareholders with a fee to allow the board to 
rescue an errant director from financial liability. While called a 
"settlement," the transaction is not really a settlement in the true sense, 
a settlement being a compromise between two opposing parties who 
sacrifice possible gains to reach a middle position. The proposed 
procedure is a use of corporate resources to end a lawsuit by bribing the 
two flesh and blood "parties"-the defendant(s) and the plaintiff's 
Senator Dodd, see Joel Seligman, The Implications a/Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 
1429 (1994) {citing 140 CONG. REC. S3695-704 {daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994)). 
A substantially similar bill, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), known as the 
"Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995," was introduced in the 104th Congress. 
A key provision directed at the alteration of the litigation "market" was the creation of 
a guardian ad !item mechanism for shareholder classes in securities class actions. The 
bill was enacted by the 104th Congress and became law over the veto of President 
Clinton. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995). Rather than a guardian ad !item, the law provides for the naming by the court 
of a "lead plaintiff' in securities class actions. In addition, the law alters procedures and 
standards for securities actions in a variety of ways sought by publicly traded companies. 
See Litigation Reform: Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform 
Bill Now Law, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (1995) (describing views of opposing 
sides and content of law); see also Litigation Reform: Industry Hails Veto Override, 
Consumer Groups, Others Opposed, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 5 (1995) (discussing 
President's veto and adverting to controversy over pleading requirement). 
A similar approach was advanced by Professors Weiss and Beckerman, who 
suggested that courts adopt policies to encourage institutional investors to serve as lead 
plaintiffs, since as large stakeholders, such investors would have appropriate incentives 
to decide whether litigation would be beneficial to a corporation's shareholders. See 
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Talldng: How Institutional-
ized Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2105-12 (1995). 
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lawyer. The fundamental. argument for allowing this to occur is 
procedural and is presented in Section IV. 
The argument is defensive in nature. Roughly stated, while corpora-
tions are not permitted to bat away derivative suits by an unrestricted 
power to dismiss them, subject only to review in a second lawsuit under 
the business judgment rule, they are permitted to establish a mechanism, 
the special litigation committee ("SLC"), that invariably asks and 
frequently persuades a court to dismiss a suit as not in the corporation's 
best interests. Such a mechanism grants substantial leverage to the · 
targets--corporate boards and management-who universally resist, 
indeed disdain, shareholder initiated efforts to recover damages from 
directors for injuries to the corporation. The SLC method of terminating 
suits is an anti-corporate litigation device, either lamented or praised, 
depending on one's view of the worthwhileness of derivative litigation. 
Given the existence of the leverage accorded boards to achieve the 
dismissal of suits, permitting boards to fund settlements through 
indemnification--i.e., to "kick" the suit by lubricating the parties with 
money instead of a judge with reasons--is no worse an alternative. 
Critically, it achieves precisely the same net payment-zero--from the 
defendant. The advantage is that it nets the goose egg at a lesser cost 
and with less delay. That is, it is a faster and cheaper route to 
frustration. 
Viewing the comparison of SLC dismissal and indemnification-funded 
settlement purely as a comparison of procedures and assuming naively 
that the board would settle the same suits that the court would have 
dismissed, the latter is unambiguously the superior procedure. If it 
produces the same substance, then the faster and cheaper procedure is 
superior. 
Identifying the principle negative requires reducing the naivete of the 
assumption. The removal of the court from the decision takes away a 
disinterested body and substitutes one of keen partiality. Despite the use 
of subgroups buffered from direct enmeshment in the defendants' 
interests, no mechanism for board created purity bleaches the board to 
the tint of an outside, independent body. One must concede that if sent 
to separate rooms to reach a resolution, it is unlikely that the court and 
the board would make all the same choices. 
The significance of this substantive difference can be thought of in at 
least three ways. First, in an indemnification resolution, the court takes 
a limited look at the payment arrangements when it approves a 
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settlement (statutes require settlements be approved). Indemnification is 
not, however, a point of emphasis; it is more nearly a point of informa-
tion for the judge of a "be advised" tenor. Second, the board has 
theoretical liability for wrongful indemnification (indemnity is only 
authorized when the director has met certain statutory standards and, 
implicitly, when it serves the corporation's interests). Secondary liability 
constitutes a safeguard. The safeguard can be strengthened by carving 
out from the liability-elimination authorizations of corporate codes the 
decision by a board to grant indemnity. Third, reputational factors 
would discipline any inclination. of boards to grant indemnity lawlessly. 
Code provisions mandate disclosure of indemnity payments in periodic 
reports to shareholders. Because almost any shareholder, whether a naif 
or a callow sophisticate, will experience such a disclosure as a startling 
revelation, the pressure for boards to act only on the basis of credible 
( and creditable) reasons will be high, arguably higher than hiring lawyers 
to build a case for dismissal to present in court: 
To the extent these answers to the problem of director partiality are 
persuasive, they also provide reassurance on the issue of whether the 
procedure, in comparison with court dismissals, weakens deterrence. In 
reviewing the salient arguments against the procedure, this Article argues 
that deterrence is not weakened. 
The most jaded observer of derivative litigation might suggest, "Why 
go through a complex so-called settlement? Just give the board the plain 
vanilla power to dismiss derivative suits. It's even cheaper and faster, 
and it creates the same result as a dismissal by a court or an indemnifi-
cation lubricated 'settlement'. Won't the same arguments about cheaper 
faster results support that result, too?" 
The answer is one of political realism. While the logic is the same, 
giving boards the power to fund settlements--throw cases out-is done 
in the framework of established conventions. Indeed, half a dozen-states 
authorize the procedure. The proposal to strip all the forms that afford 
derivative suits-from docketing to disposition-the label of litigation 
is too unsettling. By comparison, the suggestion has sometimes been 
made. to dispense with derivative suit plaintiffs, since they are figure-
heads only. The answer to both suggestions is, in essence, a breezy 
brushoff. The form with which we are familiar is litigation: plaintiff(s), 
lawyer(s), defendant(s), with either adjudication or party resolutions. For 
the viewer and the participants, the outlines of the forms must be 
preserved. Any abuse of the form is more readily monitored by 
shareholders than would be rank use of a general authority to "kick" 
suits. Reports of litigation not pursued would lack the jolt to sharehold-
ers that reports of circular trips of damages would generate. 
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Thus, the practical proposal for quicker process through director 
indemnification upon settlement of charges is worthy of a closer look. 
No other short-circuiting beyond the SLC method is a reasonable 
alternative. 
On the basis of the weak statement of the case for the procedure, it 
deserves more of a look than it receives. Despite the uncertainty of 
lessening the friction that impedes the board's response to derivative 
litigation from being risklessly enacted in every instance, when 
juxtaposed to SLC dismissals, a 'settlement' method can be seen to 
make sense in the existing balance of power between management and 
shareholders. 
This Article also raises the question of whether permitting the 
procedure might generate social good aside from the simple efficiencies 
that abbreviations of process necessarily produce. The issue is framed 
in a positive manner, unlike the core argument, which asserts that 
indemnification-driven termination is not patently worse than the 
termination process that exists. The reasoning about benefits to be taken 
from greater board leeway needs to be undertaken more cautiously. The 
argument that board dispositions may produce benefits beyond more 
efficient procedure could appear to suggest that the decisions of boards 
to end cases ( or not) are more often "accurate" than are the decisions of 
courts. Such a suggestion would be an extremely conservative claim 
since the types of cases SLC's seek courts to dismiss are "demand 
excused," in which board capacity to act appropriately is sharply suspect. 
Thus, the general presumption of board regularity accorded to the board 
decision is not present, and to suggest that allowing the board to make 
the decision might produce superior outcomes would reflect an 
extraordinarily negative assessment of judicial oversight.10 
10. The view that a court created disposition is manifestly superior to any board 
created outcome is, on the surface, somewhat at odds with the analysis of the logic of 
indemnification. See infra text accompanying notes 99-111. In that material, indemnifi-
cation is conceptualized as an escape hatch from the regime of liability administered by 
courts, in which formal legal liability can be viewed as overinclusive. Under this 
reasoning, one should view agnostically in a given case the matter of whether the court 
or the board, if hypothetically differing, would have rendered the more "efficient" 
distributional solution between the corporation and the director. See infra text 
accompanying notes 108-111. 
The impediment to such a blithe acceptance of difference is a combination of 
"structural bias" and the tethering at all times of board choices to the best interests of 
the corporation. Indeed, when a board makes a motion asking a court to dismiss a 
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Thus, any hypothesis that board dispositions may create a good result 
must be carefully framed to exclude, as an element of the comparison 
with court dispositions, the question of the rightness of the outcome, i.e., 
the board's or court's yea or nay to the suit. The issues raised in this 
Article concern the collateral effects of the proposed increase of board 
authority on the participants and on the quality of the board's conduct 
in responding to derivative suits. Principally, the question concerns the 
possibility that accountability of the board would increase from 
reconfigured statutes that seek to create a defensible mechanism for a 
more direct board role in case dispositions. In addition, the possibility 
seems worth thinking about that the availability of this procedure might 
reduce the central role assumed by insurance companies in protecting 
executives from monetary liability,. and thus in shaping the litigation 
environment and imposing costs on corporations. 
The suggestion in the second. set of materials beyond the · core 
argument is not, then, that the litigation process should be short-circuited 
on the basis that it produces mistaken outcomes, but that perhaps 
litigation could be shaped to produce social good not brought to the fore 
by an outcome, albeit a comparatively trustworthy one, purchased at the 
price of full-bore adversarial process. The second set of materials also 
proposes that corporate statutes could be designed to reward corporations 
for strengthening personal board accountability for litigation decisions 
rather than handing the same one-size-fits-all provisions for litigation to 
all corporations. The goal is to encourage defensible models of 
derivative suit, it does it in the form of a conclusion that the litigation is not in the best 
interests of the corporation. The court adopts the conclusion if it respects the 
independence of the recommending group appointed by the board and the credibility of 
the investigation on which the recommendation is based. 
By hypothesis, that standard should not. change because the board will make the 
decision without the need to persuade the court. Since the decision is prospective, the 
substantive decision of the board and the court should be the same; that is, indemnifica-
tion in this context is not a separate question from that of the imposition of legal 
liability. The two "domains" of decision-making fold into one. The best interests 
determination of whether to go forward necessarily includes an assumption that litigation 
of liability may serve the corporation, even if the legal rule is arguably overinclusive. 
A board decision to indemnify in the context of ending a piece of litigation that the court 
would take to an adverse judgment against the director chokes off adversarial 
development of the legal doctrines and thus requires a cautious deployment, in practice 
and in theory, despite the fundamental point that doctrines of liability may be 
overinclusive.. 
In contrast, indemnification after a judgment is imposed by the court would fit more 
comfortably into the theoretical point that indemnification is an escape hatch from an 
overinclusive legal regime. Paradoxically, under classic corporate doctrine, post hoc 
indemnification is virtually impossible to justify, on the grounds that a corporate 
payment without a return benefit is corporate waste. See infra text accompanying notes 
189-91. 
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corporate resolution of legally meritorious shareholder litigation, which 
might soften the negative climate of opinion surrounding derivative 
litigation driven by entrepreneurial lawyers and defensive boards. 
B. The Consensus 
In many respects the level of development of the rationale for the 
professional consensus about indemnification and that for the lay 
response are comparable. Each conforms to ready intuition and largely 
disengages from the context of derivative litigation. The influence of 
intuition is apparent. Both the lawyer's and the lay person's rejection 
of indemnification gain their force from a reaction against the apparent 
illogic of a system that fosters lawsuits where the winner of a civil 
monetary judgment by design would in many instances receive no actual 
recovery.11 The consensus is disengaged from context in that it fails 
to consider the incentives of the players in derivative litigation, most 
especially the board of directors, the nominal plaintiff in a derivative 
suit. In addition, the consensus fails to consider the impact of alternative 
statutory "grids" for derivative suit resolutions on these incentives. The 
noncontextual .nature of the reasoning about the question exacerbates the 
legal tendency to make policy based on minimal empirical reasoning or 
evidence or, at best, on the basis of common sensical bromides with a 
modicum of empirical content12 or even a "mischaracterization of 
available evidence."13 
Id. 
11. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 958. 
Another exception historically found in most statutes precludes 
indemnification of judgments and amounts paid in settling or 
otherwise disposing of actions by or in the right of the corporation. 
The basis for this rule is a belief that it would be circular if funds 
received by the corporation (the ultimate plaintiff on whose behalf an 
action by or in the right of the corporation is brought) were simply 
returned to the defendant director who paid them. 
12. Cf Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of 
Attention: Time/or Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1480 (1984) (referring to divergence 
between "reality-based" articulation of duty of care rule and traditional doctrinal 
formulations of the director's duty of care). 
13. See Seligman, supra note 9, at 1433 (suggesting U.S. Supreme Court 
mischaracterized available evidence in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 
1439 (1994)). 
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The noncontextual content of the professional consensus14 and the lay 
reaction concerning indemnification of settlement amounts has a variety 
of results. First, a limited conception of the ethos and function of 
indemnification creates a poor fit with the law's prevailing treatment of 
other aspects of derivative suit litigation and more general corporate law 
principles. 
Second, the consensus ignores possible avenues of reform. For 
example, the prevailing view fails to relate ground rules for disposing of 
derivative litigation to concrete questions about techniques for improving 
the functioning of boards of directors as the "conscience" of manage-
ment.15 If the statutory pathways to terminate derivative litigation are 
viewed in the context of evolving models for board operation, 16 the 
analysis of policy choices should become richer by virtue of taking into 
account the moral climate of the board room, 17 the aspirational effect 
on board deliberation of modes of terminating derivative suits, 18 and 
the situational impact of alternative legal rules on the players in 
derivative litigation. 19 
14. The consensus is substantial. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 905-
06 ("Most . . . statutes expressly deny indemnification to directors and officers of 
judgments or amounts paid in settlement of derivative actions, and permit indemnifica-
tion in such actions only for reasonable expenses incurred in the proceeding."). 
A majority of states (28) expressly .bar indemnification for amounts paid in settlement 
while a small minority (nine) expressly permit it, with an additional six permitting it but 
only with court approval. Id. at 925; see also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 958-61 
( discussing the apparent trend toward allowing indemnification of settlement amounts 
with court approval). 
The new Model Act indemnification sections contain a provision that can be 
described in general terms as allowing indemnification of settlement amounts where a 
director can persuade a court of facts "peculiar to his circumstances" warranting such 
indemnification. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 768 (setting forth 
revised § 8.54(a)(3)). With the adoption of the new Model Act provision for court 
approval, it may be expected that more states will allow a version of indemnification of 
settlement amounts upon court approval rather than an absolute bar. See infra text 
accompanying notes 231-35. 
15. See Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, HARV. Bus. 
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37, 39-40 (discussing function of board as "corporate 
conscience" to prevent ''unconscionable conduct"). 
16. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside 
Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 7-15 (1989) (describing functions of the board 
of directors in the "monitoring model" of corporate governance as involving, among 
other functions, attention to compliance with "substantive law and appropriate ethical 
precepts" and direct involvement in transactions relating to transfers of control). 
17. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1409 (stating that a view of the board's capacity 
or objectivity is not the underlying basis of the ALI approach to derivative litigation). 
18. Cf id. at 1415-16 (noting that the demand required/demand excused distinction 
paradoxically minimizes the board's role in derivative litigation and places the decision 
about litigation in the court's hands). 
19. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 529-48, 558-66 (surveying the incentives of 
participants in class action litigation). 
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Third, a noncontextual approach to board ability.to indemnify fails to 
cast light on the practical rationale of the entire Model Act, which 
includes a provision for disclosure of indemnification payments.20 This 
provision has the potential to buttress a vision of the corporate board's 
role in managing and settling derivative litigation as one combining 
efficiency, accountability, and moral aspiration.21 A view of indemnifi-
cation as a board option that might foster the good of greater informa-
tion for shareholders about derivative litigation should alter the calculus 
of cost and benefit that non-situational reasoning about "circular" 
movement of money assumes. A purposive conception of shareholder 
litigation as seeking net positive results measured by the recovery by the 
corporation from individual lawsuits, compared with the outlay, focuses 
evaluation on a narrow cost-benefit analysis. This is perhaps less useful 
than a conception that asks what system-wide, prospective and case-
specific, benefits can arise from mechanisms for resolution of sharehold-
er suits that lift the moral climate of the boardroom by forcing a process 
of dialogue and. disclosure. 
Fourth, failing to analyze board indemnification of directors for 
settlement amounts contextually-by comparing it with court dismissal 
of derivative suits--directs attention away from the possibility that such 
indemnification may be superior as a board accountability device to 
either a court dismissal granted, at the instance of a board initiated 
corporate motion,22 or to settlements funded by insurance payments, 
made by insurance companies facing their highest risk of exposure for 
bad faith claim denial.23 
Fifth, the analytic neglect of the function of indemnification in the 
overall context of derivative litigation is unfortunate in light of the 
20. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 16.21 (1984) ("Other Reports to 
Shareholders"). 
21. Cf Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wrs. L. 
REV. 573, 588 (discussing the deterrent effect of moral opprobrium resulting from 
publicity as weapon against insider trading) ( citing Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus 
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 78 
(J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)). 
22. See infra text accompanying note 159. 
23. Interview, supra note 3; see Eugene R. Anderson et al., Liability Insurance: 
A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49 Bus. LAW. 259, 270-72 (1993) (describing the 
"duty to indemnify" and the "duty to defend" under the Commercial General Liability 
Policy); see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 561 (describing insurance company 
exposure for bad faith refusal to settle). 
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momentum gained by efforts to sharply limit litigation by corporate 
shareholders. Close attention to indemnification might direct attention 
to nuanced reform possibilities that would discipline the process of 
derivative litigation by conferring authority to indemnify while fine-
tuning the limitation of liability rules24 to provide a real discipline on 
boards when they make the decision to indemnify another director.25 
Paradoxically, increasing corporate boards' authority to indemnify, if 
done with careful attention to the context of corporate litigation and the 
"non-givenness" of the general moral climate surrounding such litigation, 
might be a means of placing greater legal and moral pressure on boards 
to achieve defensible resolutions of derivative suits. 
Finally, the noncontextual character of the consensus is consistent with 
the general analytic neglect of the settlement process in corporate 
litigation. While the character of corporate settlements-in particular, 
the extent of their relation to the merits of cases-is controversial,26 
there is general consensus that settlements are the predominant mode of 
disposition of derivative suits.27 Yet the level of attention given to the 
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting charter amendments to 
eliminate liability of directors for fiduciary duty of care breaches); MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (Supp. 1994). 
25. Cf Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 573 (1990) (softening argument that mandatory rules 
have limited effect to suggest that mandatory rules may influence managers in such a 
way that agency costs are reduced). This Article suggests that greater freedom might 
have a salutary effect on the corporate culture. Cf id. at 573 (considering effect on 
corporate culture of legal rules compared with professional norms). 
26. Compare Alexander, supra note 8, at 522-23, 566-68 with Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 739-43 (1995) and Seligman, supra note 9, at 
1434 (concerning the merits of class action suits that settle). See also Joel Seligman, 
The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfert's "Disimplying Private 
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: the Commission's Authority," 108 
HARV. L. REV. 438, 448-57 (1994). 
27. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1436 (citing Roberta Romano, The Shareholder 
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG 56 (1991)). 
As mentioned above, the term 'settlement' is largely a misnomer, since a derivative 
suit settlement is not a compromise between two parties with opposed interests but a 
collusive agreement to end a lawsuit by financing the lawyers' fees and the damages. 
Yet a derivative suit settlement shares in common with real settlements the feature that 
the parties decide to reach a non-adversarial ending to a legal dispute. The process is 
disciplined by the rules set forth in the statutes giving the court some role in approving 
settlements and not by the opposing interests framed by a legal dispute between true 
adversaries. Thus, although it is not a mere quibble to say that derivative suit 
settlements share few characteristics with the settlements about which literature has 
developed, it is nonetheless the case that a non-adversarial resolution of legal matters 
will produce effects different from full-bore litigation. The literature on settlement is 
relevant to the question of what benefits (or negatives) might arise from a process that 
relocates the disposition of cases from adjudication to negotiation among the participants. 
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dynamics and effects of derivative suit settlement by statutes and 
scholars is scant. Policy discussions are necessarily impoverished.28 
The r_eal-world effect of the prohibition is to limit board authority on 
a subject of critical importance to any business-the bringing and 
management of litigation. A code provision prohibiting corporations 
from indemnifying directors creates a gap in the corporate board's 
capacity to manage derivative litigation. in the interests of the corpora-
tion._29 Board influence over the termination of derivative litigation is· 
otherwise affirmed by, and indeed central to, the typical corporate code's 
efforts at balancing the levers of shareholder initiative with board 
authority over corporate affairs. The gap opened in the ability of the 
board to manage the litigation is not trivial. To the contrary, it is 
significant in light of the need for efficient means of ending lawsuits that 
have some legal merit but will on balance bring more harm than benefit 
to the corporation. 
C. A Note on the Significance of the Topic 
The importance of finding socially useful pathways to terminate 
derivative litigation depends on the degree of exposure of directors to 
lawsuits for damages based on their conduct as directors. With 
substantial permission given to corporations to eliminate liability for 
directors in corporate chartering documents, the need for buttressing the 
capacity of corporations to manage derivative litigation might be 
questioned.30 It is useful to consider the type of lawsuits to which 
28. Id. at 1440 (commenting that settlement is the critical stage at which reforms 
seem necessary and remarking on the legal profession's conservatism about reforms that 
may affect its own interest). 
29. The gap can be seen most sharply where indemnification is mandatory when 
a director is successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of a suit. See, e.g., MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.52 (Supp. 1994). When combined with provisions 
making indemnification and advancement of legal expenses mandatory, the gap in board 
indemnification authority and the structuring of incentives in a manner compatible with 
continued litigation without reference to a board best-interests determination may be 
particularly hazardous to corporate best interests. 
30. Butsee William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship - A
Response to Professor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate 
Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107 (1993) (arguing that stockholders with specific 
facts are able to prosecute effectively meritorious claims for breaches of duty of loyalty 
in state courts); see also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance; 
Analysis of the American Law. Institute 's Principles of Corporate Governance:. 
Recommendations and Analysis, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 468 n.27 (1992) (contrasting state 
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directors remain exposed-i.e., suits with some merit even after liability 
of directors has been substantially reduced under the statute-and to seek 
indications of the volume of suits that appear to have some merit in the 
existing regimes of liability. 
A hypothetical may be useful. Assume a director named Harry in a 
medium-sized corporation, Y Corporation. Harry is neither· the 
paradigmatic predator nor the ideal disinterested director. He has 
personal interests of various kinds that differ from the interests of the 
shareholders. Harry has been an officer for several years, with a 
comfortable compensation package that he could not readily replicate in 
another job with another company. Harry also has financial interests in 
entities, the affairs of which could become intertwined with those of Y 
Corporation in various ways. Harry does not intend to bring active harm 
to Y Corporation or to abandon its interests, but neither does he intend 
to abandon his own interests. Harry has a healthy regard for his 
personal well-being. 
Harry is potentially capable of conduct that could give rise to a 
meritorious claim of a violation of his duty of loyalty. Y Corporation 
is publicly traded and thus a possible target for a takeover bid. Harry 
is unlikely to see the business need for a change of control of Y 
Corporation, whereby the entire management structure of the company 
will be upended. Key operations of the company would be at risk of 
relocation, creating damaging effects on local business.es in which Harry 
is an investor. If a takeover bid should occur and fail as a result of 
takeover defenses voted for by Harry, Harry may become a target of a 
shareholder's derivative suit with some degree of merit.31 Whether the 
continuation of the suit is in the best interests of Y Corporation is a 
matter that can be determined through litigation of a dismissal procedure, 
or addressed in settlement discussions shaped· by the ability of Y 
Corporation to extend an offer of indemnity to Harry for any monetary 
settlement. 32 
authorizations for corporation to relax duty of care standard with "rebuttable" 
presumption in favor of the duty of loyalty and stating that no state permits limiting or 
eliminating liability for loyalty violations, despite variations in formulation of exception 
of duty of loyalty for authorization to eliminate liability). 
31. See Ralph E. Jones, III & John P. Coonan, The Return on D & 0: Director 
and Officers Insurance, 89 BEST'S REV., PROP. & CASUALTY INS. EDITION, Feb. 1989, 
at 28 (asserting that entrenchment is a common allegation for which D & 0 insurance 
is necessary). 
32. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the effect of the formula to 
award attorneys' fees on the need for a monetary judgment to justify such fees; even 
without the preference of attorneys for awards of money damages to justify awards, the 
logic of money damages would persist. The potential for damages is necessary for 
deterrence; the assessment of money damages, even where the director is indemnified 
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Harry may also be an active investor. This activity leaves Harry open 
to possible second-guessing. Consider the following facts drawn loosely 
from a reported case.33 
Corporation Y decides to acquire another corporation through the 
purchase of preferred stock, which has voting rights attached to it. The 
corporation acquires the preferred stock. When common stock becomes 
available, the majority of the directors, including Harry, personally 
acquire all the common stock that becomes available. 
A stockholder brings a derivative suit, alleging misappropriation of a 
corporate opportunity and self-dealing. Y Corporation appoints an SLC, 
consisting of a distinguished former governor and university president, 
who was also a board member at the time of the 'disputed transactions. 
After investigation, the SLC concludes that Harry and the other 
defendant directors acted in good faith and the suit should be dismissed. 
The court concludes that the corporation has not carried its burden34 of 
proving that the SLC was independent. Furthermore, the court finds that 
the transaction is not protected by a finding that the directors acted in 
good faith, because it is now subject to a standard of entire fairness due 
to the SLC's lack of independence. 
This is an example of a case with legal merit that, in a court's view, 
must proceed. It confirms the fact that liability continues to exist, 
despite statutory permission for corporate charters to eliminate consider-
able liability. This case also illustrates the risks, and the possible 
ameliorating factors and benefits, attached to allowing boards to 
indemnify directors for settlement of derivative suits. 
Despite the considerable distinction of the board and the SLC, a court 
would not conclude the suit is lacking in legal merit, that the SLC is 
independent, and that the suit is not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. Yet the court is at pains to avoid suggesting that the SLC has any 
other than good motives. 
It is useful to consider the alternative routes the case might have taken 
if the option of settling, with a grant of indemnification to the directors, 
had been available. An obvious possibility is that the SLC would have 
for the liability, constitutes symbolic condemnation that conveys symbolic information 
about societal assessments of the director's conduct. 
33. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, 504 A.2d 571 
(Del. 1986). 
34. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
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settled the case and reimbursed the directors on the basis of the same 
thinking that led it to recommend to the court that the case be dismissed. 
Without being guilty of a corrupt motive, the SLC may have fallen into 
flawed judgment, allowing its partiality to obscure the necessity of 
looking with a skeptical eye on its own independence in addition to 
assessing the corporation's best interests and the underlying legal 
merits.35 
However, it is also possible that the risk of secondary liability for 
wrongful indemnification, or reputational harm, would have altered the 
SLC's deliberation, raising to the fore the issue of independence and 
corporate best interests. If an SLC determined that ending the case· 
without corporate recovery through the mechanism of indemnification of 
settling directors was not justified, the SLC might well pause at
recommending dismissal to the court. Without an initial examination by 
an SLC in possession of a conscience pricked by the moral weight of 
acting as the decision-maker, rather than only as the legal proponent of 
a motion to the court, the possibly mild embarrassment of having the 
court disagree on dismissal may not weigh heavily on the SLC's mind. 
After the exercise of moral responsibility associated with a full review 
of corporate options for ending the litigation, a director of· the good 
motives attributed to the above SLC might well doubt the ethics of 
attempting to persuade the court to take an action which the SLC had 
deemed personally unacceptable.36 In the event that the board indemni-
fied Harry and settled the case, when the court would have denied 
dismissal, at least Harry must bear the onus of a home grown conclusion 
that he has committed an actionable wrong. Indeed, the end result of a 
refusal by the court or the board to end the case--without Harry in the 
clear financially-may be a settlement funded by insurance. Such a 
settlement is likely to be one drained of the internal moral assessment 
35. It is worth considering whether boards might be encouraged to link the calculus 
for determining the best interests of the corporation to their assessment of the legal 
merits, which might argue for a generous assessment of the merits of the charges on the 
grounds that corporate interests would be served by articulating strong standards for 
directors' performance. 
36. Of course, much of the reasoning will take place on the part of lawyers, who 
present heavily digested recommendations to the board. In the review of options, the 
lawyers too would have the experience of reviewing the possibility of having the board 
take the direct route and appreciating the significance of any rejection of that option for 
the propriety of the next option. Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint 
in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 477, 523, 529-37 (1995) (arguing the legal constraints on corporations 
encourage managers to abdicate moral responsibility, but applying the insight to . 
proposals to broaden the corporate purpose to include ethical considerations as well as 
profit and to take into account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies). 
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that board-granted indemnification would encourage in the process of 
conceding the legal wrong and terminating the litigation. Thus, while 
no claim is made that a board termination by indemnification is superior 
to the results of court mandated litigation, it is nonetheless not a total 
wipeout for corporate accountability if a system of indemnification 
creates the occasional result that the board terminates litigation that a 
court would have permitted to continue. 
If the facts of this case had been such that the court would have 
granted dismissal, then the question is presented whether director 
indemnification might be a more beneficial route to the same result. The 
job of the SLC would be to focus not merely on legal doctrine but on 
the best interests of the corporation. Arguably, and with greater 
development of the practice of fashioning statements of a defensible 
basis for settlement via indemnification, the best interests statement may 
include a useful assessment of the flaws in conduct that should be 
acknowledged in tandem with receipt by a director of indemnification. 
That is, a more fine-grained analysis of the demerits of the conduct in 
question could be encouraged as part of a resolution of charges designed 
to serve the best interests of the corporation. 
Rather than focusing exclusively on legal doctrines that might or 
might not be a predicate for legal liability,37 the negotiations could 
address in a prudential fashion the parties' assessment of the wisdom of 
the transactions, given the legal standards, reputational considerations 
and the business atmosphere surrounding the transaction. A far more 
useful narrative of the transaction, and the lessons to take from it, might 
well be garnered from an indemnified settlement than from a record of 
court proceedings in which dismissal is granted. The court's primary 
attention is to best interests, assuming the underlying legal merits. In 
contrast, the corporation has an opportunity to create a document that 
thoroughly dissects the business and ethical content of the conduct in 
question. Indeed, a well disciplined process for creating an indemnified 
settlement would encourage the corporate representatives to articulate the 
strengths of the case against Harry and his colleagues to justify entering 
into a settlement, rather than exclusively making the case against 
liability. If associated with a requirement of disclosure and a set of 
standards for the process that encouraged the type of reflection sought 
37. See Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967-69. 
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in managerial audits, the result could be a brand of self-criticism more 
productive of accountability and of guideposts for directors' conduct 
than court-mandated dismissal of the lawsuit. 
Despite the reduction of the total monetary exposure to which Harry 
is potentially subject, it is clear that the opportunity and motives remain 
for Harry to breach his director's duty by misappropriating from his 
corporation. Thus, a constructive procedure for deterring Harry's bad 
conduct and resolving charges that arise against Harry remains a topic 
of importance in corporate law. For those cases in which the court 
would grant dismissal, the procedure of indemnification-driven dismissal 
provides the board with an opportunity to enhance the social good 
attached to the termination of the lawsuit. For those cases in which the 
court would deny dismissal, the procedure carries with it certain risks 
that are arguably ameliorated by the addition of an option that focuses 
the board's attention on whether the board could justify terminating the 
suit without consulting the court. While the board may choose 
improperly to indemnify and settle, it also may gain in moral insight 
from the review of its options and thereby choose neither to settle nor 
seek dismissal. In any event, the legal system tolerates some degree of 
risk of "wrong" decisions (as discussed below). 
Legal liability of directors remains. Within that zone of liability, 
opportunities exist to increase the social usefulness of the process for 
imposing, or foregoing the imposition of, such liability. 
D. The Need for Contextual Analysis and Policy Proposals 
Given the nonempirical quality of the legal writing about indemnifica-
tion and the significance of the gap in board authority, a framework for 
empirical reasoning needs to be articulated. Among the analytic tasks 
is to form hypotheses about the relationship between the options 
available to boards to end derivative litigation and such unruly "real-
world" phenomena as the amount purchased, terms, and cost of 
directors' and officers' insurance.38 The gap in board authority over 
38. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to empirically explore the nuances 
of the effect on the acquisition decision and the subset of questions about the interaction 
among the insured, the board, and the insurance company in an instance of covered 
litigation, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that the modes of disposition available 
have an effect on the patterns of purchase of insurance and the leverage between the 
parties when coverage comes into play. 
While seven states now allow indemnification of settlement amounts, the lore 
surrounding the business practice of executive risk protection draws heavily upon the 
visibility of Delaware law, which omits to authorize indemnification of settlement 
amounts and substantially affects the standard national practice of building protection for 
directors in the event of lawsuits against them. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974). 
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litigation may have some degree of effect on the patterns of risk 
coverage thought necessary, perhaps largely from habits brought about 
by the "grid" of protection available to directors.39 At a minimum, it 
may be hypothesized that the inability of boards to indemnify settlement 
amounts is an important factor in the practice of corporations to bear the 
cost of (lightly regulated)40 insurance coverage41 and participate in 
settlement negotiations driven substantially by a "repeat player."42 This 
repeat player, the underwriter of executive risk insurance, brings 
sophistication, experience, and situational leverage43 that gives it the 
preeminent role in managing most specific occurrences of derivative 
litigation. While the repeat player may arguably bring benefits to the 
process of litigation, such as acting as the de facto manager of corporate 
litigation and funding recoveries for the corporation as the actual 
derivative plaintiff, it also: (a) allocates influence over decision-making 
about corporate affairs to a corporate outsider; (b) (by creating an 
incentive to rely on insurance )44 imposes an overall system 
Thus, even though some states might theoretically be "laboratories of experimentation," 
, it may be that there is no critical mass of corporate players who have considered the 
possibility of altering standard practice based on the potential impact of a differing state 
law. 
39. Id.; cf Paul Sweeney, Full Siege Ahead, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov.-Dec. 1994, 
at 34 (suggesting that insurance coverage affects litigation decisions); infra text 
accompanying notes 226-27. 
40. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 259 ("Unfortunately, corporate policyholders 
cannot look to state insurance regulators for protection.") (citing Jon Harkavy, Protecting 
Buyers' Needs; State Regulators Must Give Policy Form Changes Greater Scrutiny, Bus. 
INS., July 20, 1992, at 19 ("[T]he commercial insurance consumer is little more than an 
afterthought to a state regulator .... ")). 
41. See Leo Herzel, Law Should Allow Indemnity for Derivative Suits, LEGAL 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1986, at 11 (asserting that, with statutory permission to indemnify 
directors for settlement payments, companies would only need to provide directors with 
insurance in case of insolvency). 
42. Given the prevalence of settlements, it has been said that the "strategic position 
of repeat players" in securities litigation is the primary factor in settlements, rather than 
legal standards. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: 
"Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1339, 1385 n.208 (1994) (citing Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991)). 
43. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 288 (describing typical liability insurance 
policies for corporations as contracts of adhesion sold to policyholders on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis). 
44. See Herzel, supra note 41, at 11 (arguing that directors ·prefer indemnification 
to insurance coverage but must have insurance because the risk of a derivative suit 
recovery by the corporation against the director is unindemnifiable). 
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cost----corporate insurance premiums--that creates a break-even effect, 
given investor diversification,45 less justified by loss spreading46 than 
in casualty coverage; and ( c) invites litigation that targets the insurance 
fund because of the practicality of bringing a cash payment to a 
corporation's treasury without the counter-intuitive "wash" that 
indemnification represents on a case-by-case basis. 
The plausibility of such linkage is supported by the behavior of one 
chief executive officer who has strikingly embraced an empirical 
hypothesis about the effect of insurance on corporate litigation by 
adopting a "go naked" policy of refusing to purchase insurance that pays 
directors and officers in the event of suit.47 Further indication that 
outside repeat players are not ideal solutions in the mind of the corporate 
world are recent movements to allow a greater freedom for corporations 
to self-insure48 directors and officers--a movement with the probable 
effect of aligning more closely the interests of the corporation, the 
defendant, and the insuring group.49 
Thus, assessing the gap and deciding whether the legal system's usual 
reaction to a gap-"fill it"-is in order requires a look at the entire 
context of derivative litigation in which indemnification occurs. A 
critical component is a device that has enabled boards to recapture the 
initiative in derivative litigation, after being for a time stymied by the 
legal system's view that a board whose members had been sued could 
not play a significant role in resolving the suit. The law accords a large 
measure of deference to this device, known as the special litigation 
committee, or "SLC," described below.50 The SLC has functioned in 
many instances to restore a measure of control over corporate derivative 
litigation to the boards of corporations. It is all the more striking, then, 
in evaluating the context surrounding the function indemnification might 
play, that the technical success of the SLC at enabling the corporation 
45. Cf Winter, supra note 4 at 948 (diversified investors' losses in one company 
matched by gains in companies that receive damages payments). 
46. Id. at 951 (settlements funded by insurance, if viewed in the aggregate, do not 
yield investors any return over premiums paid). 
47. Sweeney, supra note 39, at 30. 
48. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 1091-92 (noting "substantial number of 
jurisdictions" authorizing alternatives to D & 0 insurance such as self-insurance). 
49. While such a move may primarily reflect a concern for "hostile indemnifica-
tion" situations after a change of control, it nonetheless is a solution to the problems 
presented above--the pre-eminence in the particular lawsuit of a repeat player that is 
alien to the interests of the corporation and the intuitive rejection of circular movement 
of money from the defendant to the corporate treasury and back again. But see id. at 
1092 (noting rejection by Delaware of self-insurance on the grounds that it is 
"fundamentally circular"). 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 160-62. 
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to end litigation does not bring about complacency by commentators 
satisfied with the SLC as a significant factor in disciplining derivative 
litigation. Indeed, the· SLC device enjoys individual case applications 
during a time of substantial growth of anti-corporate-litigation sentiment 
and policy.51 
Evaluating, endorsing, or criticizing the SLC is not a goal of this 
Article. Despite reservations expressed frontally by skeptical scholars52 
and indirectly by judges calibrating the details of the accepted legal 
approach,53 the ability of corporations to end derivative litigation with 
.the assistance of the SLC has reached that state of affairs in which a 
legal practice or rule has moved outside the arena 'of practical dispute. 
Nothing that is written about SLCs has a prospect of ousting them from 
the arsenal of corporate defenses against derivative litigation, absent a 
movement to fundamentally reorder the mechanisms by which corpora-
tions are held accountable to shareholders54 or, more implausibly in the 
current political climate, to create corporate accountability to non-
shareholder constituencies. 
E. Contemporary Policy Currents 
The current policy context, to the contrary, is one fraught with 
reactivity to perceived negative features of shareholder litigation-the 
circulation of proposals and rhetoric aimed at disabling the mechanisms 
of shareholder litigation more radically, rather than by strengthening the 
authority of boards of directors to inanage it in the interests of the 
corporation. Among the stronger proposals that have been in circulation 
is one to shift fees in private securities actions. A requirement of higher 
51. See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 55-63; see also Dooley & 
Veasey, supra note 7, at 514 (stating that the premise of the ALI reporters in 1988 seems 
to be that there was too little derivative litigation). 
52. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1424 (describing liberal scholars' citation of 
evidence that SLCs almost invariably recommend dismissal of derivative suits). But see 
Quillen, supra note 30, at 124 (claiming that SLCs have fallen into disuse since Lewis 
v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986), 
given the risk that SLC findings will become a blueprint to prosecution of the suit); infra 
text accompanying note 212. 
53. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (business judgment rule 
does not apply when SLC recommends dismissal of a suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 
(1983). 
54. See Winter, supra note 4, at 952 (proposing appointment of a special master 
with authority to terminate derivative suits). 
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proof and pleading requirements for securities actions was enacted by 
Congress over President Clinton's objection.55 The latter policy 
initiatives, while not frontally aimed at derivative litigation,56 reflect an 
approach to the reform of corporate litigation that avoids tinkering with 
the ground rules of corporate governance. Also, the approach nominally 
leaves intact the general duties of boards to act lawfully, but prunes 
away doctrines of law and long-standing practices that enable plaintiffs 
to hire lawyers and offer proofs.57 
A negative view of corporate settlements of litigation is at the 
forefront of the current policy thinking. In other contexts, settlement is 
the mythical cure all for excesses of litigation, but not in corporate 
matters. The few reported empirical :findings, given their rarity in legal 
writing, have assumed totemic significance: the finding by Janet Cooper 
Alexander that corporate litigation is settled without reference to the 
merits58 is taken as a last word sort of :finding. Alexander demonstrates 
on a "need we say more basis" that corporate litigation and settlement 
is a corrupt and damaging process, inflicting untold waste on corporate 
America59 and emanating from opportunistic individual investors 
unconcerned with collective interests who are represented by attorneys 
55. See supra note 9. 
56. Derivative Litigation is not, in the usual instance, federal securities litigation. 
Securities litigation is typically litigated as a class action. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra 
note 26, at 747 (referring, in context of securities litigation policy proposals, to the issue 
of "private class action securities litigation."); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that breach of state law fiduciary duty, in absence of 
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, does not violate Rule I 0b-5). 
57. Even before the introduction of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, 
the director of the Enforcement Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
William McLucas warned, "[L]itigation reform should seek to eliminate frivolous claims 
and abusive litigation without diluting the effectiveness of private remedies against 
fraud." Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1993) [hereinafter McLucas Statement] (statement of William R. 
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC). 
58. Alexander, supra note 8, at 567. Citations to the Alexander piece proliferate 
with vigor in textbooks, scholarship, and judicial opinions. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 
4, at 949-51; Bell At!. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993). 
The near universal approbation of the finding-and its implications-has been 
moderated by the recent exchange between Professors Grundfest and Seligman. See 
Seligman, supra note 26; Grundfest, supra note 26. 
59. Sweeney, supra note 39, at 6 (quoting Intel general counsel on the cost of 
disposing of a frivolous suit "that $500,000 could have supported another, say, 10 
production workers. We could have had engineers designing products."); cf McLucas 
Statement, supra note 57, at 118 ("[M]ost judges believe that groundless litigation 
presents only a small problem on their dockets."). 
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prepared to file computer-stored pleadings virtually without effort.60 
The prevailing portrait does not lack for human interest, carrying with 
it the image of well-intended executives subjected to a harrowing 
onslaught of litigation as repayment for their service to the investing 
public. 61 Thus, far from being a target of critical scrutiny, the SLC is 
simply one device in the growing arsenal of weapons being developed 
by the legal system to allow corporate boards to reduce the threat of 
derivative litigation. The moral onus of the perceived shortcomings of 
derivative litigation comes to bear mainly on the reputation of the 
proponents of the litigation rather than either the targets or the context 
created by overall assumptions and policy.62 Yet the moral climate of 
derivative litigation is a social product of a collaboration in ways of 
doing business of all who participate-Code writers, the corporate bar, 
plaintiff's lawyers, directors, management, plaintiffs, investors, and legal 
commentators. If suits are brought and settled on grounds other than 
merit, it may suggest, not the need for noncontextual, technical tinkering 
mainly aimed at lawyers' incentives, but a direct concern with the 
socially created moral climate in which settlements are felt to arise from 
an impaired process of bargaining among improperly motivated 
players.63 
What might be useful in the current policy context is to demonstrate, 
as has not been done previously, the logical nexus between the 
(relatively) uncontroversial judicial and statutory practice of allowing 
SLCs to terminate shareholder suits by moving to dismiss them, and the 
generally rejected but, as this Article argues, parallel alternative of 
allowing SLCs to terminate such suits by indemnifying settling directors. 
The logical connection, not recognized, between the two types of SLC 
60. See Cordtz & Reingold, supra note 4, at 24 ("All the elements are in place: 
assertive investors, a small army of sophisticated class action attorneys and a slew of idle 
computers."). 
61. See id. at 23-25. A Louis Harris poll indicates that half of all outside directors 
have already been sued at least once in connection with their board service. Worries of 
directors increased in 1991 when a jury imposed $100 million fraud penalty on two 
Apple directors in a weak case. Id. 
62. Interestingly, solicitude for corporate executives is high at a time when public 
officials face an increasing level of scrutiny demanded by the voting public. 
63. Bell At!. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting appeal 
of settlement of derivative action settlement because of risk that "[p ]laintiffs' attorneys 
and the defendants may settle in a manner adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs by 
exchanging a low settlement for high fees"). 
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action is that the latter is simply another route to terminate cases, the 
same activity in which the SLC engages when it provides the grounds 
for a successful motion by the corporation to dismiss a derivative suit.64 
The usual arguments against the extension of the SLC's authority to 
terminate cases by settlement backed by indemnification of directors do 
not hold up well to critical scrutiny. 65 
Their vulnerability to attack by logic may or may not call for a 
rehabilitation of their object or its configuration as a critical element in 
the policy response to the perceived shortcomings of derivative litigation. 
Nonetheless, the relative unpersuasiveness of the received wisdom, 
combined with the flaws in the general conception of the policy context 
of thinking about derivative litigation, suggests the merits of greater 
attention to the possible strengths of the processes that might encourage 
the oft-maligned outcome of derivative suit settlements. Although 
comparing the SLC role in the accepted mode of termination with its 
possible role in the alternative of indemnification of directors yields 
some arguable comparative weaknesses, especially the absence of 
immediate judicial review of an adversarially litigated matter,66 it also 
yields arguable comparative strengths---the moral accountability and ( at 
least nominal) legal liability67 of the board for an action that was not 
blessed by immediate judicial review.68 
This Article, then, contains something for the proponent, and 
something for the critic, of the SLC role in terminating derivative 
litigation. Either is invited to reflect upon the insights located in this 
unexplored area of the close relationship of the SLC to a neglected 
pathway to termination of derivative litigation. The proponent may 
decide that indemnification of settlements---"filling the gap"-is 
advisable, or that, for new and different reasons, the alternative should 
continue to be rejected. The critic may regard the tightness of the 
connection-and the relentless quality of the arguments presented below 
for recognizing extending the logic of that connection as grounds not 
merely for adopting the view that the extension is not necessary but for 
pressing for a reconsideration of the accepted learning. 
64. Oblique recognition occurs in occasional judicial references to the similarity. 
See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (stating that there is 
"some analogy to a settlement in that there is a request to terminate litigation without 
a judicial termination of the merits"). 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 187-221. 
66. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. But see infra note 212 
(concerning deficiencies of SLC discovery and advocacy). 
67. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (secondary liability). 
68. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 
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The reformer, neither of the state of mind of the determined skeptic 
nor the Babbitesque proponent, may see the restatement of the question 
as one that invites a more nuanced consideration of the possibilities for 
fine-tuning the mechanism of derivative litigation rather than making 
wholesale decisions about its vitality. The opportunity arises to consider 
reasonable arguments for and against enhancing SLC roles in terminating 
litigation and to review the learning and the existing mechanisms for 
managing shareholder litigation.69 Such a review would be in search 
of policy responses to shareholder litigation sensitive to the pro's and 
con's of allowing the corporation to end such litigation by either of the 
methods--litigated dismissal or negotiated termination--rather than 
shaped more bluntly by choices of starkly differing perspectives on the 
social usefulness of shareholder litigation.70 
II. A NOTE ON ANALYSIS 
The analytic background to assessment of the gap in board authority 
arises from conceptual points about the function of doctrines of liability, 
compared with rules of financial exoneration of settling directors, general 
litigation-efficiency thinking about dispute processing, other corporate 
law doctrines that deflect punishment from directors for conduct 
deserving of some degree of moral disapprobation or deterrence, and of 
the evolution of corporate governance under the influence of reform 
proposals intended to soften the effect of board self-perpetuation. 
A. Doctrines of Liability and Indemnity 
1. Need for and Primary Source of Doctrines Protecting Directors 
from Draconian Liability 
Shielding directors from liability has an animating purpose of 
"fairness" to directors as a practical necessity for efficient delegation of 
tasks to them as agents. By hypothesis, corporations benefit from legal 
69. See Winter, supra note 4, at 949 (suggesting that existing procedures for 
derivative and class actions diminish return on capital). 
70. Cf Grundfest, supra note 26, at 742 (arguing for more "textured" conclusion 
in debate on whether merits matter in which policy strategies are sought to filter out 
weaker claims earlier in process while allowing more meritorious claims to proceed). 
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doctrines tthat protect their agents from bearing the risk associated with 
the corporations' profit generating activities. Agency doctrine, as 
utilized in the public corporation, attempts to assign risk of business loss 
to more efficient risk bearers and away from less efficient risk bear-
ers. 71 In the corporate context, this is conceived as shifting risk away 
from directors and managers for corporate losses on sub-maximal 
transactions toward the more efficient risk bearers-the corporate 
owners, i.e., the shareholders.72 Corporate costs commonly cited as 
being associated with incorrectly assigning losses to managers (not 
including the costs of the litigation itself) are discouragement of risk-
taking by corporate managers73 and harm to recruitment of competent 
corporate directors.74 If directors faced a high probability of being 
required to fund corporate business losses, competent individuals would 
not serve. If they served, they would only pursue low risk projects. 
Patently, indemnification (at least so far as indemnification for 
amounts paid to satisfy claims) does not serve as the primary safeguard 
against legal liability so draconian that rational persons would refuse to 
serve as directors. The principal safeguard is the rationality and 
reasonableness of the doctrines that impose liability on directors for 
business failure-the known tendency of the doctrines to75 serve 
primarily as aspirational statements for good conduct and to set the 
outside limits of nonfeasance,76 or malfeasance.77 The major work of 
safeguarding directors' interests so as to encourage service and risk-
taking is done by the liability doctrines themselves-not by the rules of 
indemnification. 78 
71. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL 
L. REV.' 261 (1986) (describing shareholders as more efficient risk bearers than 
managers, with citations to agency doctrine). 
72. Id. at 285 (asserting that public corporations transfer most risk to security 
holders because of their comparative advantage in bearing risk). 
73. Id. at 265. 
74. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 943. 
75. Dooley, supra note 30, at 502 (suggesting that lack of cases holding directors 
liable for negligence means articulation of duty of care is intended as mostly hortatory). 
76. Id. at 503. 
77. Id. at 506. 
78. Nonetheless, much rhetoric about indemnification and about insurance comes 
to rest upon the claim that indemnification and insurance are necessities to ensure the 
willingness of directors to serve. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 943. The result is to 
place undue emphasis on indemnification as a component of director welfare rather than 
a tool for corporate decision-making about litigation. 
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2. Role of Indemnification in Director Protection 
The exception to the marginality of indemnification as director 
protection is indemnification for the costs of defending suits. The 
common law contains the concept in its purest form: agents are entitled 
to be paid the expenses of their defense against a baseless suit brought 
because of acts they performed for their principal.79 While the liability 
doctrine ultimately is a sufficient protection against the substantive 
claim, the American rule on fees exposes agents to an intolerable risk of 
incurring transaction costs to receive the vindication to which they are 
entitled.so Common law courts and authoritative legal summaries 
conclude that agents are entitled to indemnification for expenses (and for 
judgments) in the absence of an agreement to the contrary where their 
conduct is blameless.s1 The degree of protection for the legal defense 
of conduct that is not clearly blameless is a matter that can be adjusted 
by negotiation between the principal and the agent as part of the 
understanding concerning compensation. An agreement to compensate 
is not lightly implied in the absence of express agreement, so the 
contours of indemnity is a natural subject for express agreement. 
However, between an agent and a principal which is a natural person, 
indemnity for breach of duty to the principal-protection for blamewor-
thy conduct-is equivalent to waiver or elimination of liability since the 
principal would exercise considerable caution in suing over a matter for 
which an indemnity has been extended. There is no equivalent of the 
corporate problem of lawsuits launched by a representative of the 
principal against the agent despite an agreement of indemnity ( or of 
elimination ofliability). Similarly, advance promises by a natural person 
to indemnify an agent against third party judgments for negligence run 
entirely to the benefit of the agent, since an individual can decide at any 
time to exonerate an agent (with the agent's leave). There is no need for 
enforceable agreements that permit the use of the principal's assets for 
agent exoneration, since the principal has unrestricted freedom to settle 
and indemnify in accordance with a cost-benefit judgment relating to the 
merits of a lawsuit. Thus, indemnity between private individuals is very 
79. Admiral Orient Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936). 
80. See Sweeney, supra note 39, at 6. 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 438-40, 458 (1957). 
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much a matter of inducements to serve and of compensation. The entire 
subject is one guided by the agent's interests and the pricing between the 
principal and agent of the probability of faithless or negligent conduct 
by the agent. Pricing of the riskiness of the transaction can be calibrated 
to fit the exact agency, thus enabling private principals and agents to 
strike bargains they see as fair. 2 82 
3. Limitations on Negotiated Express Agreements for Indemnity 
Complications arise where the principal is a legal entity owned by 
dispersed shareholders. The corporation's promise of indemnity is not 
equivalent to a promise by shareholders not to sue.83 · While the 
compensation problem for the agent is the same as with a private 
principal, the agent (the director) and the shareholder are not able to 
participate in the making of an express agreement concerning the 
contours of indemnification outside of the automatic common law 
protection for conduct in which an agent is sued for doing exactly the 
bidding of his principal. Thus, promises of indemnity are not equivalent 
to a waiver of liability tailored to the characteristic risks of the particular 
agency, but instead are standard forms made available to the corporate 
community and adopted by the corporation as a representative of the 
interests of both the agent (director) and the business entity with the pro-
forma approval of the principals (shareholders). At a minimum, the 
compunction not to sue does not exist. The availability of indemnifica-
tion through the corporation as principal does not answer the question 
of the propriety of a suit by the dispersed owners. 
The predictability of suits where the agent has sought to preclude them 
does not undercut the general point that substantial agent protection from 
bearing the cost of business losses derives from reasonable doctrines of 
liability. Despite the fundamental fact that the American legal system 
ranks as rational, costly litigation between the principal and the agent is 
82. A similar point has been made in the partnership context. See Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. 
LAW. 45, 54 (1993). 
Id. 
Partners often do not contract to be strict fiduciaries in the typical agency or 
trust sense of one who controls the property of another. In other words, 
partners are not necessarily comparable to directors or executives of publicly 
held corporations. Instead, partners may be self-seeking co-venturers who are 
constrained from the worst kinds of misconduct by their contingent compensa-
tion, personal liability for debts, and their co-partners' close monitoring and 
power to withdraw at any time. 
83. Cf Dooley, supra note 30, at 492 n.109 (contrasting closely held corporations, 
in which all adaptive decisions are made by the residual claimants, with publicly held 
corporations). 
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a business problem for corporations. The substantive doctrines of 
liability cannot be so sensitively calibrated that they prospectively locate 
for each instance of disputed director behavior the efficient break-point 
between avoiding a monetary penalty for well-intentioned but legally 
vulnerable conduct and extracting a penalty for conduct so blameworthy 
that its cost should fall on the agent rather than the dispersed sharehold-
ers. The resulting problem is not primarily one of undue director 
exposure to litigation and possible inefficient cost shifting of losses to 
directors and thus disincentives to service, but of litigation conducted 
with insufficient attention to the interests of a corporation. Thus, 
indemnification should be considered with primary attention to the 
business needs of corporations in the management of litigation and the 
possibilities for influencing the moral climate in. which these business 
needs are attended. to. 
4. The Separate Domains of the Law s Search for Efficient Solutions 
While much writing laments the plight of directors,84 concern for 
fairness for directors in the moral sense of just deserts is not the 
underlying rationale for. schemes of liability and indemnity. The search 
is, or should be, 85 for doctrines that allocate losses efficiently between 
directors and shareholders. Unsatisfactory results would take the form 
of uncompensated losses falling on agents or, contrariwise, the costs of 
faithless conduct being assigned to the shareholders. Policy choices to 
avert such results involve the search for a workable standard of liability 
for corporate agents86 and efficient processes and substantive rules for 
indemnification.87 · 
84. E.g., Cordtz & Reingold, supra note 4, at 22-25 (asserting that hostile climate 
makes service of corporate boards unpopular). 
85. Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. LAW. 1761 (1994) 
(arguing that the ALI Principles were unduly influenced by lawyers representing the 
interests of corporate management). 
86. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1498 (duty of care); Dooley, supra note 30, 
at 486 n.27 (discussing duty of care and limitation of liability respectively). 
87. Whatever the specific contours of statutory permissions to indemnify for types 
of obligations incurred, statutes consistently impose a standard of conduct that a director 
must be found to have met in order to be eligible for indemnification of any expense at 
all. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.51. The Act sets the following 
minimum standards: 
(I) (i) he conducted himself in good faith; and 
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The attempt of the legal system to reach efficient solutions has 
resulted in a slicing up of doctrine and process into separate domains. 
These are: (1) the articulated· rules of director conduct;88 (2) the 
standard of monetary liability to which the law in fact subjects directors 
for breaches of the rules of conduct;89 (3) the exoneration by the 
corporation (acting through the board) of the director for monetary 
liability imposed under the liability standard;90 (4) the exoneration by 
a court of the director for monetary liability imposed under the liability 
standard;91 (5) the standards for the insuring of directors by an outside 
insurance company;92 and (6) the rules for exoneration of the director 
by corporate self-insurance.93 The standard of liability once was co-
extensive with the articulation of the standards imposed by law on 
corporate directors.94 With the enactment of section 141(:t) of the 
Delaware Code95 and section 2.02(b)(4) of the Model Act,96 the 
articulation of the standards became separate from the regime of 
liability.97 The recent work in the Model Act has moved the law of 
(ii) he reasonably believed; 
(A) in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that the conduct was in 
the best interests of the corporation; and 
(B) in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation; or 
(2) he engaged in conduct for which broader indemnification has been made 
permissible or obligatory under a provision of the articles of incorporation 
(as authorized by § 2.02(b)(5)). 
88. See Dooley, supra note 30. 
89. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note I, at 741 (Model Act provision 
permitting articles of incorporations provisions eliminating or limiting director liability). 
90. See id. at 749 (indemnification discussion). 
91. See id. at 768-71 (setting forth and discussing provision for court-ordered 
indemnification). 
92. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 994-96 (discussing limits of insurance 
coverage of directors, officers and employees). 
93. See id. at 1089-97 (discussing "captive" insurance subsidiary arrangements). 
94. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1478, 1498 (arguing, prior to enactment of 
statutes permitting liability limitation, that duty of care articulation was unrealistic and 
should be reworked). 
95. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(f) (1991). 
96. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02 (b)(4) (3d ed. 1994). 
97. While § 14l(f) and § 2.02(b)(4) only permit the insertion into articles of 
limitation of liability provisions, as a practical matter, all public corporations will limit 
liability. See JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (1995) 
( over 90 percent of a random sample of 180 Delaware firms adopted a limited liability 
approach within one year of the enactment of Delaware's limitation of liability 
provision). Compare Quillen, supra note 30, at 119 (suggesting that requirement of 
shareholder vote to enact § I 02(b )(7) provision militates against dilution of standard and 
arguing that§ 102(b)(7) emphasizes enforcement of duty of care at injunction stage). 
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liability forcefully toward substantial curtailment of liability for the 
conduct of directors other than for acts of defalcation.98 
5. The Inevitable Persistence of "Extra" Liability 
Despite the breakthroughs of the proponents of a smaller sphere of 
liability for corporate agents, some unpredictable amount of liability will 
persist. Judges must interpret phrases that preserve liability for such 
conduct as "receipt of financial benefit to which [a director] is not 
entitled" and "an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation. 
" 99 Moreover, despite the political clout100 today of the forces 
that oppose the use of legal proceedings as a club to deter director 
misconduct, 101 the boundaries of legal liability will predictably shift 
with the ebb and flow of political forces and judicial opinion.102 
However much corporate codes may trim director liability under the 
influence of the corporate bar, the complications associated with solving 
the borderline cases where liability rules do not deflect actions that have 
legal merit, but may not justify cost shifting, will remain103-to be 
addressed by doctrines of indemnity. Indeed, indemnity is the play in 
the joints of legal liability-the permission for reasoned judgment by 
individuals to overcome the woodenness of legal doctrine. 
The effort to protect the corporation from bearing the cost of faithless 
conduct by agents while also protecting agents through either mandating 
98. See Dooley, supra note 30. 
99. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4)(A), (B) (3d ed. 1994). 
I 00. See Elson & Shakman, supra note 85, at 1764 (influence of management view 
in ALI Principles published in 1994). 
101. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428 (describing real benefit of derivative 
litigation as deterrence, not financial recovery). 
102. Judge Ralph Winter, whose concern about the effect of corporate litigation on 
capital formation, see Winter, supra note 4, at 948-49, has become a prominent citation 
in the anti-corporate litigation commentary (despite the balance suggested by the portion 
of the article's title referring to "protecting managers"), even to the extent of being cited 
by the Supreme Court in the course of trimming the amount of liability under the 
Securities Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, see SELIGMAN, supra note 97, at 1433, nonetheless 
held in a leading case on SLCs that the SLC was not entitled to the benefit of the 
business judgment rule in a motion_ to dismiss, because leaving the decision on 
enforcement of fiduciary duties to the defendants' appointees would eliminate fiduciary 
duties of directors and officers. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). 
103. See, e.g., Jones & Coonan, supra note 31, at 30 (referring, following first wave 
of limitation of liability statutes, to "formidable list of leftover liability exposures"). 
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or permitting indemnification thus can be seen to result in a disjunction 
of legal standards, one protective of the corporation and one protective 
of the agent. The standard for legal liability of directors is inclusive of 
director misconduct that is also included within the category of conduct 
eligible for indemnification. That is, the standard for indemnifying 
directors is more liberal to directors· than is the standard for assessing 
legal liability.104 The creation of the more liberal standard means that 
the legal system has in some sense, more or less direct, acknowledged 
that the standard for director's liability for breaches of duty is 
overinclusive. 105 The category of director liability picks up breaches 
of duty that do not demand a redistribution of entitlements from ,the 
director to the corporation, or, that, in any event, are consistent with 
distributing transaction costs from the corporation to the director. 106 
The standard to indemnify the director is more liberal, because it is 
conceived of as making available the ideal distributional solution 
following the nominal ( or actual)107 imposition of a corrective state-
ment to a breaching director. 
104. The standard is more liberal both with respect to indemnification of legal costs 
(where indemnification of liability amounts is precluded) and with respect to 
indemnification of settlement amounts. In both cases, the general point holds that legal 
doctrine acknowledges a disjunction between the goods of assessing liability as a 
symbolic corrective for agency failings and distributing costs between the agent and the 
principal. 
It is noteworthy that the Model Act expressly allows indemnification for legal 
expenses for the exact conduct for which liability has been eliminated, see MODEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.5l(a)(2) (citing § 2.02(b)(5)), and expressly, in the 
alternative, allows indemnification based upon a finding that the director was acting in 
the reasonable belief, in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that his conduct was 
in the best interests of the .corporation and, in all other cases, that his conduct was at 
least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. See id. § 8.51(a)(l)(ii)(A), (B). 
Thus, the Model Act cleanly segregates a category of indemnification that addresses 
conduct not eligible for elimination of liability. 
105. In the context of master-servant law, the argument has been made that servants 
should not bear the loss by way of indemnity to the master for their negligence when 
they have accidents in the course of working for the master, since such accidents can be 
considered "mere inadvertence" and are foreseeable results of a servant's working for 
the master. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 488 P.2d 429, 432-35 (Or. 
1971) (rejecting argument on ground that tort law requires that all persons be held 
responsible for the consequences of their wrongful acts). The Turner case is cited in J. 
DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 229-30 
(1994). 
106. "Legal remedies are sought to overcome a present distribution that is out of 
line with the parties' claimed entitlements." Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1364. 
Note that, as discussed supra note 104, even where the indemnification only covers legal 
costs, the existence of one standard imposing liability and the other redistributing legal 
costs from the recovering corporation to the breaching agent reveals a disjunction in the 
assessment of the agent's culpability. 
107. See supra note 104. 
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6. The Reason for "Extra" Liability 
What good is produced by imposing legal liability that is promptly 
canceled by the regime of indemnity? The obvious candidates are: 
deterrence of misconduct by imposing overinclusive categories of 
liability; 108 the educative function of applying corporate legal doc-
trines to novel directorial conflicts of interest; and the function of 
enlarging the "shadow of the law"109 effect on bargaining by agents 
concetning structural solutions to alleged conflicts of interest. The 
potential effect of the regime is to impose stigma, for which no 
indemnity is possible. 
The substantive doctrines of corporate cost allocation between agents 
and corporations, then, strive for a statement of the ideal distributional 
solution between directors and shareholders in terms of symbols and 
resources. If these could be imposed with complete accuracy by cost 
free decision-making, the system would attain the ideal re-
sults - deterrence, education, and innovation combined with the correct 
distribution of business losses. Given the impossibility of achieving 
perfect accuracy in decision-making, the system, in substance, tolerates 
the risk that imposition of liability or provision of indemnity will be 
over-applied or under-applied. The system distributes the risk of 
misapplication between two regimes of authoritative decision-making, 
one associated with liability imposition and one associated with 
indemnity decisions. In addition, the system tolerates the risk that 
striving for "deterrence"-stated positively, encouraging responsibili-
ty' 10-will impose costs in individual instances that exceed the recov-
ery to the corporation. 111
108. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428-29 ( discussing the deterrence effect of cases 
that do not yield a positive net recovery). . 
109. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1349 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 
950, 959-77 (1979)). 
110. See Dooley, supra note 30, at 463 (describing governance aspects of ALI 
Principles designed to promote "Responsibility," in contrast with "Authority"). 
111. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428-29 (suggesting that benefit of derivative action 
more likely lies in deterrence than in financial recovery generated); see also id. at 1436-
37 (comparing inability to measure deterrence in derivative suits to criminal law enforce-
ment). 
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B. Indemnification of Settlement Amounts as a Mode of Case 
Disposition 
The risk of inaccurate decisions about liability is primarily located in 
the adjudicative function, while the risk of inaccurate decisions about 
indemnity (or self-insurance payments) is primarily located in the 
function of private decision-making in the shadow of the law. 112 Any 
assessment of these relative risks should be made in light of a conceptual 
shift from a focus on the risks of inaccurate indemnification decisions 
(or, indeed, the incongruous results of accurate decisions)113 and 
toward a vision of indemnification of directors for settlement amounts 
as an alternative mode of disposing of derivative litigation on par with 
a motion to dismiss. 114 While indemnification of directors for settle-
ment amounts has the effect of shielding directors at the margin from an 
inappropriate shifting of costs from the principal (the group of share-
holders) to the agent (the defendant directors), it also can be thought of 
as a choice in the array of litigation-ending methods available in a legal 
system. Indemnification of directors for settlement amounts can be seen 
as a dispute resolution doctrine as well as an allocation of substantive 
entitlements and examined as a technique, with incidental allocative 
effects, of dispute resolution. As discussed below, settlements arise from 
factors created by legal doctrines and occurring in processes presided 
over by courts from close range or at a distance. 115 They are not a 
"stray byproduct of the judicial process"116 but a set of results brought 
about by policies chosen and administered by the legal system. 
C. Indemnification of Directors for Settlement Amounts 
As a Pro-Settlement Policy 
The third conceptual point concerns the fact that permitting boards to 
indemnify directors for payment of settlement amounts should generate 
more settlements, or, in any event, alter the timing of settlements. It is, 
as suggested above and described below, a pro-settlement policy. The 
policy is not merely an allocational decision relating to substantive 
entitlements, but an alteration of the probable modes of generating 
dispositions of derivative suits. Such alteration will affect: (1) the 
transaction costs; (2) the nearness to which the distribution of substan-
112. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1349. 
113. See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
115. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1390-91, quoted infra note 175. 
116. Id. 
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tive entitlements approaches the "correct" distribution of substantive 
entitlem.ents; 117 and (3) the social goods lost or gained by substituting 
settlement for litigation. 118 
1. Assessment 
Assessment of the statutory choice of allowing corporations to 
indemnify settlements requires som.e consideration of the need for, and 
the functioning of, settlement as a m.ode of ending derivative litigation. 
The first, the need for settlement, is implied by the comm.on conclusion 
by legal writers that corporate litigation imposes m.ore costs on 
corporations than it provides recovery or prevention of losses, at least for 
individual corporations m.ade the subject of litigation. 119 It has been 
argued at a system. level that various factors combine to m.ake derivative 
litigation ( and class actions by shareholders) a net drain on corporate 
assets, thereby "substantially dim.inish[ing] the return to American 
investors in American com.panies."120 Specific costs associated with 
derivative litigation are the cost, substantially borne by corporations, of 
defending directors and officers from. allocation to them. of losses 
correctly121 borne by the corporate owners122 and the costs of liabili-
ty insurance and various types of opportunity costs to the corporation of 
involvement in litigation. The starkest statement that derivative suits are 
117. See id. at 1360-64 (discussing use of "legal remedies to overcome a present 
distribution that is out of line with parties' claimed entitlements"). 
118. Id. 
119. See, e.g., Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in 
Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436, 1473 & n.169 (1994) (noting that 
"most derivative actions end not in litigation but in settlement," and arguing that 
"[s]ettlements, like derivative actions pursued to judgment, often result in a bounty to 
the attorney, yet little gain to the shareholder"); see also Winter, supra note 4, at 952 
(asserting that in most derivative and class action suits the corporation receives no 
benefit but pays everyone's legal fees). 
120. Winter, supra note 4, at 949. The evidence cited by Winter does not really 
support the proposition except in the most indirect way. Id. at 949 n.9 (citing article that 
concludes that "many [class and derivative] suits result in settlements that benefit[] the 
attorneys more than the shareholders"). 
121. It should be noted that some costs of defense are borne by the corporation even 
if the director may be said "correctly" to bear a loss. 
122. See Ronald A. Dabrowski, Note, Proportionate Liability in J0b-5 Reckless 
Fraud Cases, 44 DUKE L.J. 575, 576 (1994) (costs of defending § l0b-5 private causes 
of action are broad, ranging from direct costs of legal expenses and damages to indirect 
costs of higher insurance premiums and reputational harm); see also BLOCK ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 942. 
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not net gainers for corporations comes in the suggestion of viewing in 
the aggregate the payment of settlement amounts and litigation costs 
through funding by insurance paid for by the corporation; premiums paid 
by all corporations should be equivalent to amounts recovered.123 
2. The Anti-Settlement Tone of Writing about Corporate 
Litigation-The Need for a Fresh Look 
The writing about the problem of "inevitable inefficiency" in the 
process of derivative litigation does not necessarily assume that 
settlement is the solution to the problem. Rather, the availability of 
settlement is portrayed as an influence exacerbating the proliferation and 
reinforcing the inefficiency of lawsuits that raise the cost of capital. 124 
Among the claims made are: (1) amounts paid in settlement are largely 
unrelated to the merits of the action, 125 thereby blunting the sharpness 
of suits as a means of enforcing :fiduciary obligations; (2) the motivation 
for bringing suits is attorneys' fees, 126 which are better assured by 
settlement than by litigation; (3) management does not oppose 
settlements that fail to match the merits because "[m]anagement rarely 
cares to assume the burdens and distractions of a trial;"127 and (4) a 
large percentage of derivative and class actions are said to be frivo-
lous, 12 with the availability of attorneys' fees at settlement, even 
without a monetary recovery-the presumed motivator. 129 Unlike the 
case of the typical "bilateral" lawsuit, in which settlement often tends to 
be touted as a panacea130 for the hazards of litigation, litigation harms 
are identified as peculiarly intractable in lawsuits brought by sharehold-
ers in the name of the corporation. The specter of meritless lawsuits 
ended by collusive settlements looms large as a conceptual block to 
envisioning solutions devised out of the grab bag of techniques for 
abbreviating litigation to serve everyone's interests. 131 The primary 
123. See Winter, supra note 4, at 951 n.25. 
124. See id. at 950-51. 
125. See id. at 950 (citing Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of 
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991)). 
126. See id. at 949. 
127. See id. at 950 (no supporting evidence). 
128. Id. at 949 (citing FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING 
STOCKHOLDERS DERIVATIVE SU1TS (1944)). 
129. See id. (relying on Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation 'Without 
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 55 (1991)). 
130. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1341 ("The popular wisdom about 
civil justice perceives courts as resolving cases by adjudication, accepts that American_ 
society brings an excessive amount of litigation to the courts, and concludes that 
settlement is a good thing."). 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. 
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solutions fashioned explicitly to address concern about derivative 
litigation involve adjudication devices-adversarial confrontations, 
authoritatively decided in court, between shareholder-propelled propo-
nents of a continued suit and manager-supported opponents of continuing 
the litigation132 and other adjudication refinements, such as the require-
ment of pleading derivative suits with particularity.133 Reform propos-
als articulate a need for an ideal solution: "Some mechanism . . . must 
be adopted that weeds out meritless claims at the threshold, prevents 
claims that cannot benefit investors from going forward, does not 
overcompensate weak claims, and does not undercompensate strong 
claims."134 Because of the hypothesized impediments to party driven 
solutions based on the assumption that party motivations are insufficient-
ly adverse for greed to check greed, 135 Judge Winter has proposed the 
creation of an outside force, i.e., a special master, capable of making a 
sensitively calibrated determination of the moment when a derivative suit 
can be concluded to be a net loser for investors. 136 The goal is to bear 
the cost associated with such an ad hoc institutional framework in return 
for the gain of deterring or quickly dismissing weak claims and avoiding 
the settlement of strong claims at inadequate amounts. 137 
Such analysis presumes that settlement of derivative suits is part of a 
pathology, .and, not, as usually presumed in the evolution of thinking 
about litigation, an element of an array of solutions to societal addiction 
to litigation. 138 Yet that assumption, particularly coming from relative-
ly conservative quarters, is a startling vote of no confidence in the 
capacity of existing methods of reducing agency costs in the corporate 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 (SLC); infra text accompanying 
notes 158-68 (general description of procedures for dismissal of derivative litigation). 
133. See Winter, supra note 4, at 952. 
134. Id. at 977-78. 
135. See supra part I; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.L. REV. 1, 44 (1991) (describing perverse 
incentives for parties to propose, and strong desire of judges to approve, settlements of 
corporate litigation). 
136. See Winter, supra note 4, at 953 (If the moment arrives when "the officer 
determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding 
of liability are not substantially greater than the likely costs to the corporation, then the 
action should be dismissed."). 
137. Id. 
138. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1341. 
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context139 to place pressure on the processes surrounding settlement to 
produce the benefits sought in the bringing and resolution of derivative 
suits. The prevalence of such a vote of no confidence in quarters that 
might be expected to see the good in pro-settlement refinements to the 
litigation process is apparent in the large reduction in director liability 
adopted by the Model Act140 and the general acceleration of anti-
litigation proposals. 141 A fresh look at the question from the pro-
settlement view prevalent in other areas can direct attention conceptually 
and practically to the role indemnification of settlements might play in 
refining and strengthening derivative litigation as a mechanism of self-
govemance. 
D. Board Authority to Approve Morally Doubtful 
Conduct-Comparison of Rules for Approving 
Self-Interested Transactions 
A final conceptual point relates to the type of conduct that is viewed 
by the predominant legal doctrine as potentially blameworthy but not so 
much so that the conduct cannot be sanctioned by the board of directors. 
The salient instance in corporate doctrine of conduct occupying such an 
intermediate status of moral weight is a director's engaging in a self-
interested transaction that would be considered subject to penalties but 
is not because of the approval of other members of the board of 
directors. 142 Conduct that was once flatly prohibited has, in the 
evolution of doctrines to address the practical reality of corporate 
business dealings, been granted a degree of statutory protection, 
administered by boards of directors.143 While the distance traveled for 
the status of the conduct-from flat prohibition to a degree of statutory 
approval-is the greatest for close corporations, 14 the statutory 
assistance nonetheless applies to conduct by directors in public 
corporations of the kind that might well become subject to derivative 
suits in the absence of approval by a group of directors found eligible 
under the statutes for "blessing" an arguably interested transaction by a 
139. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 71, at 274-76 (reviewing alternative 
methods of assuring contractual performance by corporate managers). 
140. See supra note I. 
141. See supra note 9. 
142. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§§ 8.60-8.63 (3d ed. 1994) (directors' 
conflicting interest transactions). 
143. Importantly, the rationale is not the well-being of directors but the business 
needs of corporations. The residual effect is advantage to directors, but the driving force 
is the needs of business. 
144. Public corporations do not generally engage in direct transactions, in which a 
director sells property to the corporation. N.Y.S.E. Listed Co. Manual (CCH) ¶ 307.00. 
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director. 145 Indeed, the type of transaction in public corporations that 
can be insulated by the format of approval is of the type that is 
potentially subject to derivative suits--proposed organic changes in 
which directors have motives of entrenchment or self-advancement. The 
policy choice in law-making may well be between allowing directors to 
prospectively bless a doubtful transaction without direct challenge versus 
requiring after-the-fact justification. 
In short, the convergence of types of conduct that can be blessed with 
types of conduct for which directors might be indemnified demonstrates 
that the quality of conduct or the trustworthiness of directorial judgments 
about such quality of their fellow directors' conduct is not the deciding 
consideration in the gap that exists in the capacity of boards of directors 
to end derivative suits by inducing directors to settle them. The blessing 
of interested director statutes demonstrates that a broad range of conduct 
exists that, while attracting some degree of disapprobation, can expose 
directors to potential litigation losses that, consensus concludes, can and 
should be ameliorated by the action of fellow directors. 146 The 
recognition that the directors are exercising a similar judgment and 
creating a similar outcome, at least in terms of symbolic policing of 
business morals, when they approve interested director transactions as 
when they provide indemnification, points to an analysis of the pressure 
placed on the integrity of board decision-making by the structuring of 
the judgmental issue presented to the board. Such structuring is created 
by the form in which the issue is presented-approving self-interested 
transactions, indemnifying directors for settlement amounts or indemnify-
ing directors for amounts paid in judgment, and, of course, recommend-
ing dismissal of a derivative suit. 
In order to understand the existing consensus and its extent of 
divergence from the SLC model, we must first examine the fundamentals 
of derivative litigation. 
145. Cf Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 683 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) 
(ground rules for court determinations of entire fairness where a controlling or 
dominating shareholder in a public corporation appoints an independent committee to 
negotiate the terms of a forced merger of a subsidiary into a parent); Cookies Food 
Prods., Inc, v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988) (application 
of interested director approval statute to self-dealing transactions by controlling 
shareholder/director in close corporation with passive investors). 
146. See supra note 14. 
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Ill. BACK TO THE BASICS-AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVE 
LITIGATION 
The boards of directors of public corporations are agents charged with 
a duty to exercise business judgment and to act with due care and with 
disinterest on behalf of shareholders. 147 Shareholders have limited 
ability to protect their interests directly or to influence board decision-
making. 148 The shareholder derivative suit allows shareholders to seek 
damages payable to the corporate treasury for a director's breach of a 
fiduciary duty. 149 In a shareholder derivative suit, a shareholder sues 
the breaching board member in the right of the corporation. 150 The 
purpose is to allow shareholders to force action when the board iis 
reluctant to proceed against one or more other board members. 151 
A. Governing Principles 
The basic corporate· law principle that boards retain control of the 
business affairs of a corporation remains operative even when derivative 
litigation is pending. 152 The rationales are substantial and well re-
hearsed in corporate law. Critically, no sole shareholder or group of 
shareholders has a duty or ability comparable to the board's to safeguard 
the corporation's interests.153 An unconstrained license to sue directors 
would inflict devastating harm on the routine pursuit of the corporation's 
affairs. 154 The state corporation code statutes governing derivative 
suits respond to such considerations by providing procedures to enable 
147. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 20-44 (discussion of the duties of 
directors). 
148. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 588 (commenting that no 
single technique of corporate accountability is likely to be optimal under all circumstanc-
es and suggesting that shareholders are best served by an overlapping system of 
protections); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 396 (1986) (discussing 
inadequacy of proxy contest as solution to collective action problem). 
149. WILLIAM A. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 928-35 (6th ed. 1988) (explaining shareholder derivative suits). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 928. 
152. "[The dismissal section] confirms the basic principle that a derivative suit is 
an action on behalf of the corporation and therefore should be controlled by those 
directors who can exercise an independent business judgment with respect to its 
continuance." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN., ch. 7, subch. D, introductory 
comment (discussing "Derivative Proceedings"). 
153. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 71, at 271-72. 
154. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 7, at 522, cited in Granada Invs. v. DWG Corp., 
823 F. Supp. 448, 455-56 (N.D. Ohio 1993). 
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boards of directors to bring an end to at least some shareholder 
derivative suits. 155 
1. Corporate Best Interests 
The derivative suit statutes attempt to devise procedures that will allow 
a role for shareholder efforts to bring directors to task yet still accord 
respect to board judgments of corporate best interests. 156 The first role 
that the statutes set forth for the board concerns the right of the 
shareholder to maintain the suit. 157 Statutes set up a procedure for 
boards to ask the court to dismiss the suit as not in the best interests of 
the corporation. 158 The Model Act, for instance, provides that the 
court shall dismiss a derivative action if a statute-specified determining 
group "has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable 
inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the 
derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation."159 
2. Procedure: The SLC 
Again using the Model Act for illustration, the determining votes may 
arise from either a majority vote of independent directors present at a 
meeting of the board if the independent directors constitute a quorum, 
or, without reference to the quorum, a majority vote of a committee 
consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by majority 
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of 
directors.160 In the alternative, upon motion by the corporation, a court 
may appoint a panel of independent persons to make a determina-
tion. 161 Typically, corporations avail themselves of the opportunity to 
make a credible statement to the court about the worthiness of the 
litigation by appointing a committee of independent directors. This 
155. See, e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 721-33 (function of demand 
requirement to retain director control over derivative suits); id. at 830-34 (describing 
state statutes patterened after Model Act provisions for dismissal of derivative 
proceedings upon motion of independent directors). 
156. Id. at 711-20. 
157. See id. at 830-34. 
158. Id. 
159. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 (3d ed. 1994). 
160. Id. § 7.44(b)(l)-(2). 
161. Id. § 7.44(f). 
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committee, which is called an "SLC" or special litigation committee, 
discussed above, then investigates the charges. 162 This statutorily 
blessed group gains stature from the experience and independence of its 
membership. 163 It proceeds to determine whether maintenance of the 
suit is in the best interests of the corporation.164 If the SLC's conclu-
sion is negative, the corporation then moves to dismiss the suit. As 
noted above, dismissal must occur if the corporation has met the 
statutory standards of a good faith determination following reasonable 
inquiry upon which the conclusion is based.165 
The Model Act places the burden of proof for this issue on the 
corporation if a majority of the board of directors does not consist of 
independent directors at the time the determination is made. The burden 
is placed on the plaintiff if the majority of the board of directors does 
consist of independent directors at the time of the determination. 166 
Despite differences in the particular approaches taken in various codes, 
the typical refrain-the one expressed in the Model Act-is to allow the 
board to retain its primary role as the conservator of the corporation's 
best interests even though one or more members of the board may be 
implicated in wrongdoing. 167 
3. Consensual Resolutions 
Although the screening device may end litigation, in effect aborting 
it at the outset, it does so through a full blown legal contest. 168 In 
contrast, many of the actual pathways for ending a derivative suit short 
of judgment require negotiation and consensus of the parties. Yet, 
compared with the screening mechanism, scenarios for consensual 
endings receive little statutory attention. 169 The disparity is unsurpris-
162. See DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 5:14, at 56-58 (describing creation by 
corporations of special litigation committees). 
163. See, e.g., In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (applying a 
"totality of the circumstances" test to assess independence of Special Litigation 
Committee (citing Johnson v. Hui, 811 F. Supp. 479, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1991))). 
164. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44(a) (3d ed. 1994). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. § 7.44(e). 
167. Id. § 7.44 & cmt. 
168. It is beyond the scope of this Article to document the procedural and 
chronological sequence of discovery and litigation about whether to litigate the alleged 
cause of action that takes place in a typical dismissal procedure. See generally Joel 
Seligman, The Disinterested Person, An Alternative Approach to Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 360-62 (1992) for a discussion of the 
discovery process in the litigation of motions to dismiss derivative litigation. 
169. The basic rules respecting settlement of derivative suits are described tersely 
in the Model Act as follows: "A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or 
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ing, because a negotiation is not a legal contest and does not require 
formal elaboration. Nonetheless, consensual endings are frequently of 
more practical import than an initial argument over the future of the 
litigation. The screening process, heavily elaborated as a moment of 
formal legal decision-making, is in fact a moment that may never arrive 
for many suits. 170 As a principle example, in suits that the board of 
directors chooses to settle without at any time seeking to reject the 
shareholder's effort to proceed on behalf of the corporation, the ending 
may foreclose the need for the screening mechanism. 171 
Thus, suits come and go in a multitude of fashions. Their means of 
exit share one feature in common--the legal system has found a way to 
bless a termination of the suit. The board may seek to constrain a 
shareholder's effort to prosecute to judgment .a suit in the interest of the 
corporation by a variety of means: (1) rejection of demand172 coupled 
with a motion of the corporation to dismiss173 based on a special 
litigation committee's recommendation (the screening process); or (2) 
settlement encouraged by either (a) payment of the defendant directors' 
costs of suit, including fees or settlement amounts or both, or (b) a 
structural remedy that imposes no damages on the defendant direc-
tors.174 These suit-ending efforts may occur-indeed will occur-in 
settled without the court's approval. If the court determines that a proposed discontinu-
ance or settlement will substantially affect the interests of the corporation's shareholders 
or a class of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders 
affected." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.45 (3d ed. 1994). 
170. DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 2 ("Most derivative suits are ultimately 
dismissed or settled rather than tried."). 
171. See, e.g., In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing 
SLC's conclusion that settlement was superior to moving to terminate the derivative 
action entirely in light of settlement's capping fees and costs at amount less than 
potential fees and costs of litigating motion to dismiss). 
172. The Model Act requires a shareholder who intends to pursue derivative 
litigation to place a demand to sue upon the corporation, to wit: 
"No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: 
(1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable 
action; and 
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the 
shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by 
the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result 
by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day period." 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.42 (3d ed. 1994). 
173. Id. § 7.44. 
, 174. For example, procedures may be put in place to avoid repetition of the 
behavior challenged by the litigation. The suit may terminate on this basis with no 
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different derivative suits in sequences and with practical meanings that 
are part of the unique shape of the given suit. The statutes, by 
concentrating attention on the role of the board at the entry screen, 
address only a portion of the available termination scenarios for a given 
derivative suit. It is the underreasoning, a form of neglect not unique to 
corporate statutes, 175 by the statutory drafters respecting the remainder 
of litigation-ending events that has given rise to the problem addressed 
by this Article. 
B. A Gap in the Board s Role 
As seen above, the Model Act's conceptualization of the screening of 
derivative litigation does not displace the deference granted to director 
action, and, absent disabling conflict,176 accords a presumption· of 
regularity to board judgment.177 In the statutory planning for deriva-
tive litigation, where the question of the amount of liability is set aside 
and the ground rules for engagement between management and 
shareholder representatives are devised, a balance is sought that protects 
the board's role compared with outside decision-makers. Courts have a 
vital role, yet a limited one. The Model Act provides courts with 
techniques that avert their displacing the directors of corporations at the 
urging of derivative plaintiffs. 
payment by the defendants, although the corporation will pay a counsel's fee to 
plaintiff's lawyer for the benefit to the corporation that resulted from the lawsuit. See, 
e.g., Granada Invs. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 451 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (settlement 
dismissing claims against defendant Victor Posner in exchange for Posner's relinquish-
ment of both board positions and exercise of voting control over common stock of 
company). 
175. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1390-91. 
Once courts were envisioned as dedicated exclusively to adjudication, so that 
settlement was seen as the product of a consensual private departure from the 
public forum. The results were an accidental byproduct for which the court 
was not accountable .... But now it is common knowledge that most remedy 
seeking in the vicinity of courts is going to eventuate in settlement. We share 
an inescapable awareness that courts do more than adjudicate. They preside 
over a cluster of dispute processes. They project models, sanctions, bargaining 
chips, categories, and doctrine that support processes of negotiation, mediation, 
and arbitration, some within the precincts of the courts and some at a distance. 
Once we see settlements not as a stray byproduct of the judicial process, but 
as part of the essential core, the responsibilities of courts can no longer be 
defined as co-extensive with adjudication. Once we apprehend the multiplex 
connection between court and settlement, ensuring the quality of these 
processes and the settlements they produce is a central task of the administra-
tion of justice. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
176. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 {e) {3d ed. 1994). 
177. Id. 
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Why does the Model Act derivative suit procedure appear to repose 
such confidence in boards? The answer lies in part in the unsuitability, 
well described in volumes of legal and. business writing,178 of any 
other candidate. Given the depth of the consensus that the board must 
govern, for no one else can, the Model Act, like the corporate codes it 
influences, is based on a vis.ion of the corporation as a profit maximizing 
entity using agents to advance the wealth of a collective body of 
shareholders. 179 The underlying psychology, determined in degrees by 
necessity rather than science, depicts agents, pulled by the ties of 
collegiality and friendship, 180 but capable of functioning honestly to 
advance the best interests of the corporation,-i.e. capable of making 
honest determinations that the best interests of the corporation will be 
served by rejections of shareholder efforts to sue directors on the 
corporation's behalf. 181 The picture of board authority over litigation 
developed by the Model Act drafters is a particularly bright one. The 
Model Act displays a limited degree of concern for structural bias, 182 
but generally grants directors who are not lawsuit targets their undimin-
ished status as :fiduciaries when making derivative suit determinations, 
whatever the course of events that brought them to the board. 183 
178. See, e.g., BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-11 ( discussing the historical view 
that neither courts nor shareholders are competent to manage corporations). 
179. See id. at 8 ( discussing need of directors for broad discretion to permit 
decisions entailing risk). See also Granada Invs . .v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 
(N.D. Ohio 1993) (citing Daniel H. Pink, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good/or 
America Good/or General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 180, 181 (1990)). 
180. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 7, at 534 (skeptical summary of concept of 
structural bias). For a vigorously argued view that numerous factors militate against 
independent directors' acting independently to disapprove overreaching interested 
transactions by fellow directors or· to evaluate the merits of derivative suits 
evenhandedly, see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or 
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 607-20 (1982). 
181. See Brudney, supra note 180, at 607-20 (arguing that outside directors have 
incentives to act independently of management). 
182. Although the normal rule is that the plaintiff has the burden of challenging the 
bona fides of a committee that determined that continuation of a suit is not in the 
corporation's best interests, the burden shifts to the corporation when the majority of the 
entire board is deemed not to be independent of the litigation. With a seeming 
reluctance, the committee adopted this burden-shifting rule "to respond to concerns of 
structural bias." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN., commentary to § 7.44 (3d ed. 
1994). 
183. But see DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 5:16, at 65 ("[C]ourts have not arrived at 
a consensus position on the appropriateness of the litigation committee device as a 
means to determine the corporation's position in derivative litigation, nor do courts agree 
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If boards are the forum for shaping shareholder efforts to litigate on 
the corporation's behalf into a case disposition that protects the best 
interests of the corporation, gaps in the ability of the board to act as a 
source of authority for any type of ending scenario represent a puzzling 
impairment of boards' ability to act constructively on behalf of 
shareholders, at least where director misconduct is implicated. A 
gap--whereby boards are not merely hampered but precluded from 
effecting a particular type of resolution-would suggest that the Model 
Act drafters, despite their seemingly happy view of the credibility of 
board determinations in dismissal proceedings, have not discarded all 
worries about board credibility and good faith in derivative suit 
litigation. If such a gap also disabled boards from taking the practical 
steps necessary to achieve a settlement, it is of both practical and 
theoretical interest. 
As already discussed above, the existence of such a gap is clear. In 
the flow of real world litigation, it is a significant subtraction from the 
authority and the ability of a board to end derivative litigation on a 
schedule that it considers to serve the best interests of the corporation. 
While statutory provisions for ending derivative litigation recognize that 
some suits will end in settlement, 184 the heavy consensus condemns 
indemnification of directors for amounts paid in settlement of derivative 
litigation. 185 Yet settlement negotiations-the weighing and measur-
ing, chopping and cutting, buying and selling-take place between 
parties who have something to offer and something to gain. If the 
amount paid in settlement cannot be indemnified-thus making 
impossible the board's assuring such indemnification-the defendant 
directors may lack the incentive to accept a settlement on terms desired 
by the board. The board, however, may view a settlement as the 
quickest, least costly method of terminating the suit, a method plainly 
superior to a longer, more expensive procedure involving the screening 
of the case by an SLC and the litigation by all parties of a corporate 
motion to dismiss. Such a possibility is by no means fanciful, as is seen 
in a recent federal district court decision in which the court agreed with 
on the appropriate degree or content of judicial review in this context."); id. § 5.18, at 
71 (questioning credibility of special litigation committees, especially use of 
'"expansion' or replacement directors to c.onstitute ... committee"). Compare Joy v. 
North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the "conflict of interest which 
renders the business judgment rule inapplicable in the case of directors who are 
defendants is hardly eliminated by the creation of a special litigation committee"). 
184. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 7.45 (discontinuance or settlement); see 
also Michigan Business Corporation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1496 (West 
1990 & Supp. 1995) (discontinuance or settlement of derivative proceeding). 
185. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2. 
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the SLC that it was in the best interests of the corporation to settle the 
suit rather than to engage in a litigation of a dismissal motion.186 The 
perverse effect of the condemnation is therefore to hobble the efforts of 
the only group charged with a duty to the corporation--its board of 
directors. The plaintiff's lawyer is concerned with her fee, the 
defendants with their skin, the insurance company, if any, with its 
treasury. The board alone is directed to ,consider with dispassion the 
interests of the shareholders. 
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: THE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT 
As previously noted, the drafters of corporate legislation hesitated to 
accord to boards a role in a principal practical mode of terminating 
derivative litigation largely because of relatively abstracted arguments 
and intuitions. The forces that ordinarily serve as advocates for the 
interests of management uncharacteristically abandon the pro-manage-
ment perspective on indemnification of directors for settlement 
payments, saving their firepower for an assault on the legitimacy of 
shareholder initiated litigation and the existence of liability for directors. 
Let us look critically at the anti-indemnification arguments as they have 
generally been presented. 
A. The Arguments Against Indemnification of Settlement Amounts 
1. Circularity 
The principal theme struck against allowing indemnification of 
settlement amounts, that is, the principal argument favoring a gap in the 
board's practical ability to end derivative litigation, is circularity of 
recovery. Circularity of recovery refers to the immediate return by the 
corporation to a director of amounts paid by that director in settlement 
of a suit charging a breach of directorial duty.187 The idea imbedded 
186. In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-44 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
187. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note l, at 761; AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 918 ( discussing circularity in connection with prohibition of 
indemnification of amounts paid to satisfy an adverse judgment); BLOCK, ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 958 {"The basis for this rule [against indemnification of settlement amounts] 
is a belief that it would be circular if funds received by the corporation (the ultimate 
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in the phrase is that derivative litigation which ends in the return of the 
recovered amounts to the defendant is not only futile but indeed harmful 
to the corporation. As the ABA Commentary states: 
Permitting indemnification of settlements and judgments in derivative 
proceedings would give rise to a circularity in which the corporation receiving 
payment of damages by the director in the settlement or judgment (less 
attorneys' fees) would then immediately return the same amount to the director 
(including attorneys' fees) as indemnification. Thus, the corporation would be 
in a poorer economic position than if there had been no proceeding. 188 
. . 
A strong intuition wars with allowing such a result.. 
a. The Inaptness of a "Corporate Waste." Argument 
The ABA Commentary, however, pairs the recommendation and 
argument against indemnification of amounts paid in settlement with the 
recommendation against indemnification of amounts paid to satisfy an 
adverse judgment.189 This pairing erases a critical distinction between 
the two types of indemnification. Only by restoring the distinction may 
the analysis prove instructive. Where circularity concerns repayment by 
the corporation to the director of judgment amounts, the argument seems 
plainly to be a good fit for the corporate law goal of advancing the best 
interests of the corporation. When a director has been found liable for 
misconduct in a court adjudication, no construction is viable that the 
corporation's interest would be served by sending the recovery in a 
circle back to the civilly liable director. Indeed, where the circumstance 
involves an adverse judgment, classic corporate doctrine bristles with 
rules190 that would prohibit a board-authorized approval of a return 
payment, for which a benefit to the corporation appears wholly.lacking. 
Seen in this light, the meaning of the circularity reference, which carries 
such persuasive power as a one word summary of the case against 
indemnification of amounts paid in judgment, is that boards should not 
plaintiff on whose behalf an action by or in the right of a corporation is brought) were 
simply returned to the defendant director who paid them." (citing DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE§ 6:08, at 6-54 (1994) and 
1 ERNEST L. FOLK, ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
§ 145.5 (3rd ed. 1992 & Supp. 1992))). 
188. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 761. 
189. Id. 
190. See Kaufman v. Beal, 1983 WL 20295, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1983) 
( doctrine of corporate waste applied to payment to directors found to have lacked a 
corporate purpose), discussed in Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business 
Judgment Rule, and The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. 
LAW. 1355, 1365 (1993). 
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waste corporate assets by paying sums of money without any matching 
benefit to the corporation. 191 
In contrast, indemnification of directors for sums paid in settlement 
could indeed involve a consideration of the corporation's best interests 
in that the possibility of indemnification may play a central role in a 
consideration by the board of a method of disposing of litigation that 
appears to be bringing more harm to the corporation th.an possible 
benefit. 192 A determination that the corporation's best interests would 
be served by a settlement that is encouraged by-and perhaps dependent 
upon--indemnification of the settlement is a prudential judgment that is 
located in the· very heart of the board's responsibility to exercise 
business judgment. The term circularity of recovery lacks an animating 
meaning when transposed from the context of an adverse judgment to 
the context of a settlement. The force of the argument, powerful in the 
instance of the adverse judgment, is fully spent on its proper object, and 
wholly unpersuasive when aimed recklessly at a genuine business 
judgment rendered by the board. 
Moreover, the argument of circularity does not show a consistency 
with the overall model for board management of derivative litigation. 
The prototype for board management of derivative litigation is to 
provide a mechanism that enables the board to deem a suit "not in the 
best interests" of the corporation and for courts to provide some measure 
of respect for that determination. 193 While specific implementations 
of the prototype vary in the degree of deference accorded the board 
mechanism, the Model Act and the specific statutes have in common the 
expectation that the board may create an outcome in which the 
corporation receives a recovery of zero. The phrase circularity of 
recovery, while piquant, nonetheless describes a result that is the 
equivalent of the outcome of board-driven dismissals of derivative 
litigation--zero recovery for the corporation. In fact, since costs are 
inevitably incurred in the dismissal proceeding, the corporation will as 
much be a net loser in this scenario as in a negotiated termination 
involving indemnification of amounts paid in settlement. Thus, 
191. Cf Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 
(N.Y. 1955) (discussing common law rules disfavoring reimbursement of directors' and 
insurgents' expenses in proxy contests). 
192. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 890 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a derivative 
suit may be dismissed if a court finds that dismissal is in the corporation's best interest). 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 156-67. 
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circularity does not describe a result that differs from other available 
outcomes in the prototype and cannot be viewed as an objection on the 
basis of outcome. 
b. Inconsistency with Treatment of Expenses 
The argument of circularity is also inconsistent with the typical 
generosity of the models in allowing boards to reimburse a director's 
expenses, even where the director settles the suit with an admission of 
culpability.194 Although the funds used to repay the legal fees are not 
sent in a tight circle, in that the payment funds legal fees rather than 
liability, the principle remains the same. The payment to the corporation 
is reduced by a simultaneous payment to the director. That payment for 
fees may well exceed the recovery to the corporation. Indeed, the longer 
the litigation persists, the more that such legal fees will mount, imposing 
on the corporation a risk of a suit ending in a low recovery where the 
corporation is contractually obligated to provide indemnification.195 
Mounting legal fees add to the circumference of a circle of futile activity 
and wasteful expenditures in many instances. Yet the prototype of 
194. The MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. provides in newly adopted § 8.51 
(d)(l) (3d ed. 1994): 
Unless ordered by a court under section 8.54(a)(3), a corporation may not 
indemnify a director: 
(1) in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation, 
except for reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding 
if it is determined that the director has met the relevant standard of conduct 
under section (a). 
Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 756 (setting forth the text of the 
proposed statute). 
195. It should be noted that contracts that entitle directors to reimbursement are 
enforceable. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.58 {3d ed. 1994), which 
permits a corporation to obligate itself in advance to provide indemnification that is 
authorized by the statute. See also Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 779-
80 (setting forth text of proposed statute and commenting: "Many corporations have 
adopted such provisions, often with shareholder approval."). It is also of interest that, 
once such obligatory indemnification has been provided by contract with the director, 
courts have counted the prospective obligation to reimburse attorneys' fees as one of the 
costs that counts against the advisability of continued litigation. See In re Oracle, 852 
F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that because "the indemnicy agreements 
require Oracle to advance to the individual defendants their costs of suits which the 
defendants are not required to reimburse unless they are found not to be entitled to 
indemnification . . . Oracle faces the prospect of financing both sides of the derivative 
litigation"). Cf. Joy, 692 F.2d at 892 (counting as costs of continuing the litigation 
indemnification that is mandatory under corporate by-laws, private contract or state law 
but refusing to count for best interest determination indemnification the corporation may 
pay as a matter of discretion). 
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derivative litigation views the circle in which legal fees travel as 
tolerable despite the futility. 196 
2. Concerns about Meritless Suits 
Although the circularity argument does not of itself justify the gap in 
a board's ability to influence the outcome of derivative litigation that the 
bar on indemnification produces, there are other justifications, both 
practical and theoretical, that merit close attention. The portion of the 
Model Act commentary quoted earlier continues: 
In view of these considerations [liability limiting code provisions], it is unlikely 
that directors will be unnecessarily exposed to meritless actions. In addition, 
if directors were to be indemnified for amounts paid in settlement, the dismissal 
procedures ... might not be fully employed since it could be less expensive for 
the corporation to indemnify the directors immediately for the amount of the 
claimed damages rather than bear the expense of the inquiry required by [the 
dismissal procedures]. The result could increase the filing of meritless 
derivative proceedings in order to generate small but immediately paid 
attorneys' fees. 197 
The arguments advanced are twofold. One relates to the absence of 
meritless suits, and the other to their presence. 
a. Specious Litigation As the Wrong Issue 
The first argument is that indemnification of s_ettlement amounts is 
unnecessary since specious suits are unlikely to occur. The second is 
that authorization for indemnification of settlement amounts will, in self-
defeating fashion, create incentives for such suits. 
The initial argument is undeniably correct to the extent that it 
characterizes specious litigation as a fairly minor problem. The barriers 
196. In this regard the Model Act is typical. See Committee on Corporate Laws, 
supra note 1, at 756, 761-62 (setting forth text of§ 8.5l(d)(l) authorizing board to 
indemnify for legal expenses even in the case of settlement and commenting: "Despite 
the prohibitions on indemnification of a settlement or a judgment in a derivative 
proceeding, subsection (d)(l) permits indemnification of the related reasonable expenses 
incurred in that proceeding so long as the director meets the relevant standards of 
conduct set forth in section 8.5l(a)."); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 
2, § 7.20 (b)(l)(d) (excluding board payment of settlement amounts but not excluding 
board payment of expenses where director settles case); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) 
(1991) (allowing indemnification of attorneys' fees in settlements). 
197. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 761. 
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standing in the way of strike suits adequately protect corporations from 
rampant harassing litigation. Yet the argument misdescribes the type of 
suit to which corporations need to take strong, flexible responses. The 
Model Act fails to address the practical threat to directors that lies in the 
possibility that complex corporate transactions may, although conducted 
in good faith, give rise to colorable claims of breach of duty, particularly 
where self interest is involved.198 It is these claims that can produce 
the type of protracted, expensive litigation that the board would probably 
wish to terminate at a cost lower than that which continued litigation 
would produce. The ability to indemnify amounts paid in settlement 
would provide an avenue to end the matter via settlement, an avenue that 
may otherwise prove unacceptable to the defendant directors. 
Of course, if the suit is harmful to the corporation's interests, the 
corporation could seek termination via the screening process set forth in 
the statutes. Yet, as previously suggested and as the Model Act 
commentary notes, authorization to indemnify directors for amounts paid 
in settlement may lead a board to forego the screening route where the 
realities of the case point to a cheaper, more expeditious method of 
termination based on settlement via indemnification. On its face, the 
result is not a bad one. Legislative strictures that demand that more 
cumbersome and costly methods be utilized cannot be said to be 
obviously in the corporation's best interests. Thus, the gap referred to 
earlier produces its effect. Nonetheless, there are additional consider-
ations that cannot be ignored, which suggest that closing the gap will 
produce unwanted side effects. 
b. Board Resistance io "Strike Suits" 
In the course of its second argument noted above, the Model Act 
commentary suggests that the ease of termination that settlement plus 
indemnification produces carries with it the encouragement of strike suits 
in which plaintiffs' lawyers expect to be, and are in effect, bribed to 
accept the settlement. Yet it is not apparent why such. suits should 
appear to be a pressing problem.199 Here the concern primarily 
emanates from a protective stance toward target corporations, which 
would pay unnecessary settlements and legal fees and suffer the 
distraction of numerous nuisance suits. The argument is not supported 
by reference to any empirical evidence or case lore, and should .be 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
199. See supra note 35 (arguing that corporations may benefit if boards assess 
merits more generously in a settlement posture than in a court adjudication approach); 
see also infra note 200. 
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assessed in light of other disciplinary mechanisms for discouraging 
meritless litigation.200 In light of sanctions for frivolous litigation 
imposed by the courts and the attorney's ethical duties in signing 
pleadings, the argument does not appear strong on its own merits. 
What of this argument's fit into the overaH conception of derivative 
litigation? It appears to be a poor fit. The board is conceived of as a 
body that is vigilant to protect the corporation's business interests and 
is thus empowered in the prototype model for dismissing derivative 
litigation to make inquiries and determinations that result in the dismissal 
of suits.201 The model reposes trust in the board's ability to form 
judgments about the appropriate level of inquiry necessitated by the 
gravity and credibility of the charges. Statutes presuppose sufficient 
inquiries where the charges are grave,202 in a circumstance where 
considerable temptation for rote recitations praying for a "best interests" 
dismissal of charges against colleagues looms large in the eyes of critics 
of the model dismissal procedures.203 While the board is trusted to dig 
a deep trench of investigation204 when charges against present or 
former colleagues are grave and credible, it isnot trusted to safeguard 
the interests of the corporation in responding to meritless suits. While 
it may be true that well funded targets have the occasional impulse to 
ward off pests with small payments, genuine harm would only arise if 
weak willed corporate boards were so disposed to dispense sums of 
money as to create a culture of corporate blackmail reminiscent of 
nineteenth century matrimonial suits handled by the firm of Howe & 
Hummel.205 Such deterioration of the corporate ethical climate will 
not occur if for no other reason than the fact that directors will not ask 
200. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. A more vigilant stance against potential meritless litigation 
may have been thought necessary at one time because of courts' traditional reluctance 
to require the payment of attorneys' fees for frivolous lawsuits. See CHARLES W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 16.6 (1986). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 156-67. 
202. But see DEMOTT, supra note 1. 
203. Brudney, supra note 180; see also Seligman, supra note 168 (discussing 
discovery). 
204. But see Brudney, supra note 180, at 607-20 (skepticism concerning 
independent directors' independence); Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 (deficiencies of 
SLC fact-finding) . 
205. Cf RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS 
HISTORY 112 (1947) (general charges of seduction under the promise of marriage 
redeemable by alleged seducers at sums varying between five and ten thousand dollars). 
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their colleagues to sully their reputations by pleading guilty to totally 
unfounded allegations of scurrilous behavior. 
3. Structural Bias 
Although never stated in the Model Act commentary, the fundamental 
objection to indemnification for amounts paid in settlement, indeed the 
only objection that has serious force, is that its very utility in permitting 
expeditious termination of suits makes it easier for structural bias206 to 
rear its head once more. The concern is that a board, sympathetic to the 
plight of fellow directors who :find themselves the target of litigation, 
will seek to take them out of the line of :fire regardless of the merits of 
the case. To the extent that this does occur, individual corporations will 
lose the benefit of litigation in which they would be net gainers, and the 
deterrent effect of derivative suits is diluted. The same concern, of 
course, is present in the screening process, where the Model Act drafters 
grant considerable deference to a directorial determination that continued 
litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation. Nonetheless, in 
that situation, immediate judicial review occurs, a factor that is not 
involved in a board determination to pay indemnification. It would 
therefore seem that the structural bias risk is greater in the indemnifica-
tion situation. 
In fact it is doubtful that this is the case. Two responses are apparent, 
the :first of only modest rebuttal value and the second of much stronger 
force. The :first concerns the opportunity that settlement approval 
proceedings afford the court to learn of the intended indemnification. If 
indemnification of settlement is to occur, it will normally be part of an 
arrangement in which the board consents to the payment in order for the 
settlement to be accomplished. At the time the parties present the 
settlement to the court for approval, candor will require that they also 
apprise the court of the indemnification arrangement. A degree of 
judicial examination of that aspect of the case is likely to occur.207 
The judicial review will not, however, be of the most far-reaching 
variety. Concededly, the judicial approval of a settlement takes place in 
the context of a proceeding in which all parties are in agreement; no one 
is challenging any aspect of the proposed case resolution. The conse-
quence may be a less searching judicial review at the point of settlement 
than after the heated debate surrounding a corporate motion to dismiss 
following a statutory screening procedure. 
206. See supra note 10. 
207. See In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (judicial 
recognition of the expectation of indemnification of defendant directors' attorneys' fees). 
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Nonetheless, although judicial review of the indemnification process 
may not of itself calm all fears about structural bias, a second response 
to fears about structural bias provides a significant degree of comfort. 
The decision to indemnify must be made in compliance with statutory 
standards. The board must decide that the settling directors either 
engaged in conduct for which the statute allows corporate charters to 
eliminate liability or that they acted in good faith and in a reasonable 
belief that the action was in, or not opposed to, the corporation's best 
interests.208 Thus, the board must not only determine that its grant of 
indemnification is itself in the corporation's best interests, but also that 
the relevant standard for indemnification has been met. A failure to 
comply with the duties leaves the board vulnerable to possible personal 
liability209 (unless the Model Act's new provision, adopted in 1994, is 
in effect-allowing elimination of personal liability for conduct if it falls 
short of receipt of a financial benefit to which a director is not entitled, 
an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or its shareholders, 
or an intentional violation of criminal law.)210 This vulnerability, a 
208. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 756 (setting forth proposed 
§ 8.51(a) requiring a corporation to indemnify a director if"(i) he conducted himself in 
good faith; and (ii) (A) in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that his conduct 
was in the best interests of the corporation; and (B) in all other cases, that his conduct 
was at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation"); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1994) (featuring a similar standard). 
Id. 
209. See supra note 87. 
210. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 2.02(b). 
The articles of incorporation may set forth: 
( 4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the 
corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or 
any failure to take action, as a director, except liability for: 
(A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he 
is not entitled; 
(B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the sharehold-
ers· 
(C) a violation of section 8.33; or 
(D) an intentional violation of criminal law. 
By comparison, Delaware law allows liability to be eliminated for breaches of 
fiduciary duty other than, among others, breaches of the duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its shareholders, acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve 
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, or a transaction from which the 
director derived an improper personal benefit. 
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vulnerability that Code writers have the option of reinforcing,211 
contrasts sharply with both the minimal risk that directors face when 
seeking to have a suit dismissed via the screening process and the veil 
of good faith that is tossed across the fact-finding on which is predicated 
an SLC finding that a proceeding is not in the best interests of the 
corporation.212 In a dismissal proceeding, the directors are attempting 
to convince a court to respect their conclusion that the suit should end. 
Assuming that they have not flagrantly misled the judge, the danger of 
some sanction is remote.213 The decision to indemnify, however, is 
one that the board makes and must accept responsibility for. Thus, the 
desire to assist fellow directors and remain loyal to the group may be 
tempered by a reasonable concern to preserve personal reputation and 
avoid exposure to renewed legal proceedings. 
One might argue that the legal hazard of improper indemnification is 
virtually obliterated by the statutory permissions to eliminate, by 
provisions inserted in the articles of incorporation, personal liability for 
negligent conduct by directors, particularly given the Model Act 
broadening of the permitted exculpatory language as compared with'the 
language in Delaware.214 Given the broad exculpation permitted by 
211. See infra text accompanying notes 237-38. 
212. See Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 for a litany of the manifold deficiencies 
of the fact-finding process in which counsel for a special litigation committee engages 
(describing lesser incentive of SLC counsel to probe witness' veracity compared with 
adversarial counsel, lesser penalties for witness memory lapse or fabrication than in 
courtroom, psychological predisposition of SLC counsel to accept corporate witness 
claims, and limitations of evidentiary basis for SLC counsel to question witnesses). 
It should be noted that the issue presented to the court is not whether continuing the 
suit is in the best interests of the corporation, but whether the court finds that the SLC 
has made a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which 
its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the 
best interests of the corporation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 7.44(a) (3d ed. 
1994). Thus, the investigation need only withstand scrutiny as to good faith and 
reasonableness, not accuracy, thoroughness, or even defensibility of the conclusion. 
Arguably, the standard for dismissal and the structure of the decision-making process is 
less demanding than in the case of approval of interested director transactions. In the 
latter, the safe harbor protection of such transactions. from later attack can vanish if 
disclosure is inadequate. Moreover, some cases suggest that courts should apply a 
"heightened scrutiny" to transactions in which a portion of the board blesses the interest-
ed-director transaction of other members of the board. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act
ANN. § 8.31 cmt. (1970) ("sole purpose of section 8.31. is to sharply limit the common 
law principle of automatic voidability" conflict of interest transactions); see also Fliegler 
v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 (Del. 1976) (conflict of interest section does not remove 
conflict of interest from judicial scrutiny); Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes 
Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1988) (holding that the common 
law relating to interested director transactions is not negated by statutory procedures to 
allow interested director transactions without clear breach of duty). 
213. See Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 (concerning fact-finding). 
214. See supra note 210. 
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the Model Act, secondary liability to which directors might be subject 
is relatively unrealistic. 
This need not be considered an insuperable problem. The solution is 
relatively straightforward. Any code provision permitting indemnifica-
tion of directors for payment of settlement amounts should be accompa-
nied by a code provision excepting decisions to award such indemnity 
from the coverage of the liability limiting provision. The provision as 
it now exists is arguably insufficiently nuanced. It extends the right of 
prospective exculpation of directors to all corporations for all types of 
corporation transactions, whether routine or extraordinary in nature and 
limited only by actual receipt of an improper personal benefit or by the 
commission of an intentional and focused act of harm aimed ( seemingly 
maliciously) at the corporation. The provision is noncontextual, 
conferring limitation of liability on the vast array of corporate entities 
wholly without reference to qualifying characteristics. As will be 
discussed below, thinking about the context of indemnification draws 
attention to the possibilities of more nuanced policy choices for 
corporate accountability. The statutory means are readily at hand to 
strengthen the moral currency in which indemnification decisions are 
made and to maintain the advantage in director accountability of 
indemnification scenarios for lawsuit termination over dismissal 
scenarios. 
4. Consideration of Deterrence Value 
For such reasons, concern that the deterrence value of derivative 
litigation would be diluted by authorizing indemnification of settlements 
seems misplaced as well. Among the goals of an indemnification statute 
propounded by the drafters of the Model Act is to "prohibit indemnifica-
tion where it might protect or encourage wrongful or improper con-
duct. "215 While loss of deterrence is not cited in the case in chief 
against indemnification of settlement amounts,216 concern not to 
"encourage socially undesirable conduct" is one of the policy underpin-
nings of a statute on the subject of indemnification and advance of 
expenses set forth in the Model Act exposition.217 
215. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 750. 
216. Id. at 761. 
217. Id. at 750. 
1119 
What is the likelihood that a board member, intent on committing an 
intentional breach of duty, would be prospectively influenced by the 
availability of board approved payment of settlement amounts to proceed 
with such a breach? The practical concern would be that a director, 
unable to purchase insurance218 protection for intentional breaches of 
duty, would view the availability of board approved indemnification as 
a security for malfeasance. The director would presumably view the 
board as a reliable ally that would act without reference to the usual 
statutory standard for granting indemnification-a finding that the 
director had a good faith belief her action was in, or not opposed to, the 
best interests of the corporation.219 To conclude that deterrence value 
is lost by allowing boards to indemnify directors for settlement requires 
a belief that a prospectively breaching director would place faith in the 
probability of a board decision to indemnify in defiance of the statute, 
with the attendant liabilities on, and reputational harm to, board members 
acting in breach of their own duties. Given the mechanisms for assuring 
a disinterested board for indemnification determinations,220 the specter 
of lawless boards acting in such an unchecked fashion is unrealistic.221 
Will boards of directors never abuse the power to indemnify directors 
for amounts paid in settlement? Certainly some will. The risk of abuse 
is highest when the settlement follows the court's rejection of a 
218. See BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 4, at 993 (overwhelming majority of 
indemnification statutes authorize corporations to purchase and maintain liability 
insurance for directors and officers); id. at 1075-83 (describing "D & O" insurance crisis 
of the mid-1980s ). 
219. See supra note 87. 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 157-67. 
221. See Dooley, supra note 30, at 507 (arguing that directors are unlikely to 
forgive morally culpable cheating in comparison with treatment of mistakes in 
judgment). 
Indeed, the preference of boards to dismiss derivative litigation is said to be 
encouraged by a boardroom culture that views derivative suits as unscrupulous. James 
D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and 
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89 (1985). 
Since a settlement is an acknowledgment that the suit has merit, it may be a more 
difficult decision for a board subject to bias against such suits than the decision to seek 
dismissal, despite the protective aspect of also proving indemnification of the liability 
to a fellow director. 
In addition, after a board acknowledges liability, deciding to indemnify on the grounds 
that the director has met the applicable standards is arguably a weightier moral judgment 
than asking a court to dismiss a suit on the grounds that continuing the suit is not in the 
best interests of the corporation (which may be made without regard to the moral 
culpability of the defendant director). If a board engages in a sequence of reasoning by 
which it a) concludes that the suit has sufficient merit for a settlement and b) concludes 
that indemnification of the director for the settlement payment is not defensible, the 
. usual readiness of boards to seek dismissal may well diminish, despite the logically 
distinct nature of the questions posed by settlement versus dismissal. 
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corporation's motion to dismiss on best interests grounds, or when 
indemnification occurs in the post-settlement period independently of the 
settlement. In the first case, the corporation may be seeking to 
overcome a judicial determination that the suit should proceed; in the 
second situation, the board is permitting circularity to occur, in 
circumstances reminiscent of indemnification of adverse judgments, that 
is, without any corresponding corporate benefit. Yet the flagrant nature 
of such abuse militates against ready resort to it by faithless boards. 
Courts, in command of procedural history, may hesitate to approve 
settlements that seek to vitiate a judicial finding that a suit should 
proceed. Likewise, directors may be hard pressed to justify payments of 
settlement amounts to defendants who settled with no assurance that 
indemnification would occur. 
In sum, the risk of abuse is real, but far from uncontainable or 
inevitable. Each corporate dispute has its own personality, with 
possibilities for constructive settlements or misuse of statutory process. 
For the reasons discussed above, the probability of abuse should not be 
estimated to be so high that the benefits of board authority to indemnify 
amounts paid in settlement are overlooked. On the other side of a 
balance scale from the risk of abuse sit the benefits of closing the gap 
that now prohibits boards from seeking the cheapest, most expeditious 
manner of ending litigation that they conclude is not in the company's 
best interests. 
V. A NOTE ON THE CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING SETTLEMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DERIVATIVE SUITS 
It has been suggested above that the ready equation of the prevalence 
of settlement in corporate litigation with negative conclusions about the 
usefulness of such litigation may be a too ready assumption that 
corporate settlements do not produce socially useful results. While it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to assess empirically the social utility 
of settlements of corporate lawsuits, in particular derivative suits, it is 
nonetheless useful to briefly consider the criteria that might form the 
basis of an empirical evaluation. Galanter and Cahill have proposed 
several categories of hypotheses of reasons why settlements in the 
general context of litigation are useful. They label these as arguments 
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concerning party-preference, cost-reduction, superior-outcome, and 
superior general effects.222 
Because, as discussed above in the summary of the argument,223 
settlement in derivative litigation is not, in standard terms, settlement, 
but rather a purchased ending of a lawsuit, the settlement literature may 
be seen as lacking direct relevance to settlement via indemnification. 
Certainly, it is apparent that the first criterion is non-operative, since the 
plaintiff is in large part an abstraction and the satisfaction of the 
"players" is of no theoretical or practical importance. The cost reduction 
criterion is applicable to, and is the principal component. of, the 
"procedural" argument presented above. 
As mentioned above, a derivative suit settlement shares in common 
with real settlement the feature that the parties decide to reach a non-
adversarial ending to a legal dispute. Despite the bloodless character of 
any issues of party satisfaction, the decision to divert the litigation from 
an adversarial pathway to final conclusion is a social collaboration, 
involving parties who engage in different actions to end the suit co-
operatively rather than to contest it.224 The nature of the collaboration 
is not preordained. The criteria that the settlement literature proposes for 
assessing settlement compared with litigation are also suggestive of 
opportunities in the shaping of statutory options for the termination of 
litigation by which it may be possible to affect the moral content of the 
process. 
The superior-outcome and superior-general-effects categories contain 
the criteria with potential application to, and conceptual development for, 
derivative suit settlements. The specific criteria listed by Galanter and 
222. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1350-56. 
223. See supra part I.A. 
224. In addition, the dispute is "real" in that it represents contested perspectives 
generally associated with "insiders" and investors. However, it should be conceded that, 
by hypothesis, the right solution can only be the decision that the court would have 
made; the underlying assumption is that the parties do not have the capacity to find a 
better resolution than the court. 
This may appear to be in contrast to other settlements, where the parties have the 
ability to compromise their selfish interests from the most expansive claim of entitlement 
to an agreeable middle position. But the theory of settlement does not posit a universe 
of legal disputes in which there are no right answers and the parties may supply any of 
several equally valid answers, but a world in which the cost and uncertainty of 
vindicating legal entitlements makes parties willing to accept less than their entitlements. 
Because a party whose selfish interests are at stake chooses a compromise of entitlement, 
the concern for legitimacy is not as sharply posed, but it is still present. See Galanter 
& Cahill, supra note 42, at 1362 (discussing "full entitlement" standard). But see id. at 
1347 (suggesting that actors may define disputes differently as a result of engaging in 
settlement rather than adjudication). The theoretical difference between derivative suit 
"settlements" and other settlements is not on the order of a chasm. 
J 
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Cahill under superior-outcome are golden mean, superior knowledge, 
normative richness, inventiveness, more compliance, and personal 
transformation. Under superior-general-effects are found deterrence, 
moral education, mobilization and demobilization, and precedent and 
patteming.225 While some of these seem more applicable to disputes 
between individuals, several of them are evocative of the types of 
benefits that could flow from an explicitly designed process for enabling 
boards of directors to embrace settlements as constructive outcomes of 
derivative litigation. 
There is, however, no existing set of controlled experiments that might 
provide a basis for tentative conclusions. Although certain states now 
allow indemnification of settling directors, it does not appear likely that 
these states provide a fertile territory for empirical comparisons with 
practices in states that maintain the bar. The tendency to rely on 
directors' and officers' insurance, for instance, does not seem likely to 
be less pronounced in the former states. It seems fair to conclude, on 
the available evidence, that the market for executive risk insurance is a 
national one, in which the standards of coverage and practice are set 
nationally and companies do not negotiate changed terms to reflect 
individual circumstances, including the law of the state of incorpora-
tion.226 It also seems likely that the corporate mind-set created by the 
national market and the prevalence of reliance on insurance for 
protection of executives blunts the impact of variation in incentives to 
purchase directors' insurance that might be created by the differences in 
corporate statutes. For example, corporate lawyers in Michigan-which 
permits indemnification of settling directors--represent both Michigan 
corporations and Delaware corporations. Despite high levels of 
sophistication, they do not differentiate the insurance needs of Michigan 
and Delaware corporate executives, nor do outside attorneys report direct 
experience with the insurance practices of their clients.227 The pre-
dominant views of derivative litigation appear to influence executives 
and their advisers. General truths about the risk level for corporate 
executives and the need for insurance are in circulation without reference 
to state law variations. 
225. See id. at 1371-87. 
226. See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 262 n.18, 286-89. 
227. Telephone Interview with Cyril Moscow, corporate lawyer practicing in Mich. 
((Apr. 4, 1995). 
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An alteration of statutes (more generally than in a handful of states) 
that directed attention to settlement as a viable and approved alternative 
might influence the climate of sophisticated opinion about derivative 
litigation and thus reshape practices. The necessity for insurance might 
be rethought; pricing could be affected. While the assumption that the 
board would only settle those cases that the court would dismiss leaves 
a chunk of liability for which prospective indemni:fica{ion does not 
protect a director, the moral climate should be nonetheless altered and 
some of the negative response to director exposure to lawsuits softened. 
It would be clear that the unindemni:fiable legal exposure would be for 
acts that.resemble, in moral quality, theft from the corporation, for which 
the court would determine that litigation of the matter is in the best 
interests of the corporation, despite the many costs and negative factors. 
The potential for practice to evolve, as it has been suggested it might 
in the area of corporate purchase of insurance, has relevance to the 
issues of moral education as well as precedent and patterning. Two 
concerns about the effect of settlement on these criteria of the social 
utility of dispute resolution might arise from the phenomenon in 
litigation of confidentiality agreements. First, moral education would be 
compromised by settlements that relieve a director of :financial exposure 
and obscure the facts of the case. Second, precedent and patterning 
would be reduced by private settlements that are not published. In 
addition, settlements, even if published, might not produce law in the 
sense that judicial decision-making does. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the relevant comparison 
remains that between cases the court would have dismissed and cases 
that the board settles. In such cases, when the court dismisses the case 
on the basis of corporate best interests, it will have affirmed that the 
charges have legal substance. But the focus of the court is not on 
resolving the charges. The court, therefore, does not typically produce 
fine-grained analysis of the alleged breach.228 A settlement of the 
same charges has the potential to equal or exceed in educative function 
the court opinion dismissing the case. The nub of the matter is a 
requirement of disclosure that precludes standard confidentiality 
agreements, in which the settling parties recite that the act of settling 
does not constitute an admission. 
Further development of a requirement of disclosure, such as has been 
included in section 16.21 of the Model Business Corporations Act, could 
228. Cf Black, supra note 25, at 584 (suggesting that judges have limited power 
to create nontrivial corporate law). 
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enhance the "general effect"229 by avoiding what Galanter and Cahill 
refer to as "the appropriation for private benefit of the public goods 
produced by the dispute processes"230 as a result of confidentiality 
agreements. When considering the comparison of indemnification-driven 
settlement and court dismissal, the comparison should be made in light 
of the opportunity to shape the process by which settlements are 
fashioned. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. An Alternative Approach: Court Approval? 
This Article suggests that the ddecision to indemnify payments made 
in settlement could be treated as simply one more aspect of corporate 
life where boards exercise their discretion. If the risk of abuse is 
considered to be greater than this proposal for a strong board role in 
indemnification of settlement amounts acknowledges, the option of court 
approval of such indemnification may appear an attractive middle 
position. 
As. previously noted, the Model Act contains a provision for court 
approval.231 It is framed, however, without fashioning a statutory 
format for the board to exercise any function. Indeed, the discussion 
above has accorded little emphasis to the Model Act provision for court 
approval, instead it has suggested that the provision is best denominated 
as an escape valve and has treated the Model Act as one that removes 
the board from the process of awarding indemnification for settlement 
payments. By its terms, the Model Act court approval provision 
excludes the board from any statutorily assigned role. The only party 
that can petition for such payment is the director, who must establish 
that the award would be "fair and reasonable."232 The commentary to 
the relevant sections speaks of the process somewhat cryptically: 
229. See supra text accompanying note 225. 
230. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1386. 
231. See supra note 14. 
232. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §8.54(a) (3d ed. 1994). Indeed, the Model 
Act drafters themselves state: "[F]or the unusual situation, an 'escape hatch' is provided 
in section 8.54(a)(3), permitting a court to order indemnification for settlements of 
derivative proceedings." Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 743-44. 
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A director seeking court-ordered indemnification or expense advance under 
section 8.54{a)(3) must show that there are/acts peculiar to his situation that 
make it fair and reasonable to both the corporation and to the director to 
override an intra-corporate declination or any otherwise applicable statutory 
prohibition against indemnification, e.g., sections 8.5l(a) or (d) .... 
It should be emphasized again, however, that the director seeking indemnifi-
cation must make a showing· of fairness and reasonableness and that exercise 
of the power granted by section 8.54(a)(3) is committed to the court's 
discretion. 233 . 
Both the form of the statute, confining the moving party to the 
director herself, and the commentary appear to envision a situation in
which, after settlement occurrs, a director may attempt to convince a 
court either of her rectitude or some extraordinary circumstance that 
would allow the court to soften the generally applicable rule. The 
provision does not fill the gap, discussed above, in the ability of the 
board to fashion a settlement of which indemnification is an essential 
part. Put another way, the Model Act places the focus on whether 
atypical circumstances justify a director's petition for discretionary court-
ordered indemnification rather than whether the best interests of the 
corporation demand that the board provide indemnification. 
To be sure, a corporation could utilize the Model Act to permit boards 
to indemnify as part of a settlement package. The director, who must 
make the motion for indemnification, could function as a transmitter of 
the work product of the corporation's lawyers arguing their case for the 
wisdom of indemnification. A court, overlooking the structure of the 
Model Act provision as an after-the-fact appeal for court mercy, might 
then order indemnification as part of the settlement process without 
applying rigorously the statutory guidance to search for "peculiar 
circumstances" that appeal to the court's conscience. At best, this is 
a backhanded approach, the application of which is uncertain and thus 
of limited utility as a board asset in settlement negotiations. 
More importantly, the wresting away of the provision from its 
intended use as a backstop to assure fairness to individuals234 to an 
unintended use as part of a board managed settlement · creates the 
undesirable effect of insulating the board from responsibility for, or 
liability resulting from, improper indemnification. If a corporation 
succeeds in achieving its purpose to indemnify.by means of a director's 
motion appealing to the court's mercy, the board of the corporation 
escapes all accountability for a board action. The corporation has made 
no court motion, as it does in the case of a motion to dismiss, and thus 
233. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 770 (emphasis added). 
234. See id. 
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need not take the reputational risk associated with corporate endorsement 
of the indemnification. In addition, it has not taken any corporate action 
for which the responsible board members could be held personally liable. 
The Model Act provision is, therefore, not a good source for a middle 
position of allowing court approval. If court approval is to be the 
mechanism for increasing the board's capacity to settle derivative 
litigation but subjecting board recommendations to a heightened judicial 
review,235 court-accorded indemnification should be at the 
corporation's behest and based upon an explicit consideration of two 
criteria: 1) the director has met the statutory standards for indemnifica-
tion; and 2) granting of indemnification will serve the corporation's best 
interests. 
Whether such a mechanism for court approval constitutes a superior 
approach depends upon the estimate of the gain received as a result of 
additional court process compared with the increase in expense 
associated with additional judicial review. Because the hearing that 
would occur under a statute allowing the corporation to seek court 
approval of payment of settlement amounts would occur without the 
presence of an advocate against the proposition that indemnification 
would serve the corporation's interests, the additional scrutiny is not of 
the character that can be expected in a litigated dismissal proceeding. 
Thus, the amount of additional confidence in the result that is purchased 
with an increase in legal expenses and time and with a reduction in the 
assurance the corporation can provide directors during negotiations is 
unclear.. Moreover, court approval, even where the corporation makes 
the motion, at least partially cheapens the moral currency with which the 
board pays the settlement amount to a present or former colleague. 
Thus, the middle ground of court approval does not appear to be a 
good compromise point, for it lacks the quality of a sound compromise. 
A sound compromise should be that, except for the areas of intended 
concession, the position being compromised-here, a policy against 
overly convenient avenues for boards to indemnify settlement 
amounts--is not otherwise worsened. For better or worse, the question 
presents a choice between competing visions of corporate law and 
235. The level of attention accorded to the fees awarded to plaintiffs' attorneys in 
derivative litigation might be a useful comparison. For an example of such court review 
of fees, see In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-59 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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reality. Drafters of codes should, rather than temporize, make the 
choice. 
B. Procedural Argument: Conclusion 
The bar on indemnification of settlement amounts is by no means cost 
free for corporations that engage routinely in complex transactions that 
invite second-guessing of their agents by shareholders. Were the case 
against allowing such payments a strong one that stood up well to 
critical scrutiny, the cost might well be seen as necessary. But the case 
in favor of allowing boards, in the exercise of their fiduciary duty and 
with due regard for the consequences of its breach, to conclude that the 
corporation will benefit from expeditious consensual conclusion of a 
particular suit has sufficient substance to suggest that the benefits and 
burdens of the bar need a new weighing. An effort to compromise is 
not advisable, however. The choice should be taken between the 
traditional bar on indemnification of settlement amounts and the proposal 
for a fuller board role set forth herein. Drafters should avoid fudging 
the choice by adding court review, the benefits of which are doubtful 
and the effect of which may be, ironically, to lighten the board's sense 
of accountability for an indemnification payment. 
C. Configuring Policy-New Alternatives? 
The choice of allowing indemnification of directors for settlement 
payments need not be conceptualized starkly as a yes or no option within 
an unchanged existing system of derivative litigation. Derivative 
litigation is not a naturally occurring phenomenon of invariant moral 
content.236 The participants take their guidance from the statutory 
narrative that validates the roles they play. 
The existing statutory grid for disposing of derivative litigation is 
substantially determined by a set of debates over subtle variations in 
emphasis on the business judgment rule and structural bias that give 
greater or lesser encouragement to the use of derivative litigation to 
Id. 
236. Compare Black, supra note 25, at 576. 
We usually evaluate changes in corporate law taking as given the attitudes of 
the people affected by the change. That assumption works well for local 
change, but may fail for global change. Ifwe don't allow for cultural change, 
a global change may seem worse than the current set of rules when it is really 
an improvement. Yet allowing for cultural change in designing optimal rules 
is nearly impossible. How can we do more than speculate about how culture 
might change? 
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monitor director conduct.237 These debates have been fully vetted and 
are not a likely source for new policy initiatives in legislation setting the 
balance of power between the participants in derivative litigation. 
1. Time to Shop for a New Model of Raincoat? 
A potentially more fertile source of ideas for policy configuration is 
a careful look at how the statutes might effect a socially useful process 
in which corporate boards make self-assessments leading to defensible 
outcomes of derivative litigation. This context-seeking to insert moral 
accountability and visible resolutions of claims of director misconduct 
into derivative litigation--could become the basis for a more textured set 
of statutes, designed to create incentives for corporations to create 
credible processes for resolving charges of directorial misconduct. The 
current statutory practice of extending standard treatment to corporations, 
including uniform availability of liability limiting charter provisions, 
could be rethought to make available alternative regimes of accountabili-
ty conditioned upon differing corporate approaches to shielding directors 
from financial risk. 
Current statutes produce a system of substantial buffering of directors 
from liability, despite the continued existence of doctrines to police their 
adherence to fiduciary duty. In particular, the statutes contain an 
authorization for a "raincoat" protection for all directors, granted 
unconditionally without regard to the alignment of powers and interests 
between directors, management, and shareholders in any given corpora-
tion and without regard to the risks associated in any given corporation 
with director malfeasance. 
The first obvious alteration of that unconditional grant of exoneration 
in a manner sensitive to context should be for it to. be withdrawn from 
the decision of a board to indemnify a director for settling a derivative 
lawsuit. States that allow such indemnification should amend their 
statutes and states that adopt such a grant of indemnification power 
should only do so in connection with amending their raincoat provision. 
The argument against the proposal would be that directors would not use 
the indemnification procedure if they took on such exposure in doing so; 
if true, nothing would be lost from the present system. But those boards 
that had the confidence in their integrity, legal knowledge, and practical 
237. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
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judgment would have the opportunity to act in the interests of the 
corporation and with appropriate, wholesome disclosure. Given the 
variety of corporations and corporate legal and investor environments, 
this freeing up of the corporate statute from the strictures of cold-eyed 
realism-wholesale exoneration because lawsuits are generally suspect 
and a bar on indemnification of settlements because boards are generally 
suspect-would be a constructive beginning in the direction of more 
nuanced statutes. 
2. Liability by Menu? 
Other more thorough-going changes can be imagined. Instead of a 
unitary system applicable to all corporations, there could be a menu 
approach, which corporate charters can elect. The theoretical pricing by 
shareholders can be hypothesized to move corporations toward regimes 
more highly valued by shareholders. While proposals of menu
approaches in other corporate law contexts238 have languished, the 
degree of discontent with corporate litigation may make experimentation 
more attractive than in areas where problems are perceived as heavily 
theoretical. 
How might these choices of regime be designed? One possibility 
would consist of the following combination of features of the regime of 
liability for an electing corporation: 
1) No bar on indemnification of settlements; 
2) No raincoat provisions at all; 
3) Creation of a guardian ad litem, to whom plaintiff lawyers report; 
and 
4) Limitation of insurance coverage of directors to amounts for 
draconian liability. 
The guardian ad litem mechanism is similar to a proposal in the 
Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1994 for securities class ac-
tions.239 One should recall once more that a hypothesis that no 
corporation would elect this or that no board member would serve is not 
fatal, since it is only presented as an available choice in a statutory menu 
of regimes of liability. The existence of one corporation that, on its own 
motion, disclaims the use of directors' and officers' insurance has been 
previously noted.240 Statutory rewards might well nudge other corpo-
rations in similar directions. 
238. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19135 (1982) (proposing issuer 
control over policy on including shareholder proposals in issuer's proxy statement). 
239. See supra note 4. 
240. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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3. Getting More Radical: Changing Lawyers' Incentives 
A m.ore radical proposal would be to afford electing corporations a 
statutory limitation of lawsuits against them. to ones in which the 
shareholders' attorney is drawn from. a cadre of lawyers certified as 
corporate monitors, with an ethical code that specifies that the interests 
of the corporation m.ust be regarded as their "client's" interests. Fees 
would be paid from a fund created by contributions in lieu of insurance 
premiums. While the savings from foregoing insurance coverage would 
be reduced, there would be a considerable gain in the credibility of the 
process brought about by severing the attorneys' incentives from the 
search for an award of attorneys' fees the size of which is tied to the 
benefit brought to the corporation by the litigation. 
The alternative described m.ay be too greatly at odds with fundamental 
features of our system. of litigation; a politically viable and prudent 
method for constructing the list of attorneys would be a knotty problem. 
One possibility is for an electing corporation to publish annually the list 
of attorneys it has certified for the role; shareholder advocates could 
em.ploy adverse publicity to penalize corporations that did not choose 
attorneys deemed credible and competent. Another possibility is to 
create a body to certify such lawyers. While either of these methods is 
a radical departure from. the entrepreneurial model of lawyering241 that 
now controls the dynamics of corporate litigation, the problems of an 
entrepreneurial driven system have been diagnosed and regretted 
endlessly. Experimentation that departs from. that system, rather than 
merely tinkering with the balance of adversarial power in an entrepre-
neurial system, would be useful. An additional benefit might be the
education of a body of lawyers practicing at the state level who were 
drawn to corporate law for reasons of public service rather than an 
241. Nonetheless, it would still enjoy the benefits of the private development of 
legal resources and their provision through market-based private entrepreneurs, 
particularly if the control on the identity of the lawyers was corporate disclosure. By 
way of contrast, other solutions to the ills of the entrepreneurial system impose greater 
probable costs. For instance, Judge Winter has suggested a special master with the 
authority to stop a lawsuit when it passes the point of bringing benefit to investors. This 
is a mechanism bearing some resemblance to a court, with the same type of associated 
costs but constituting an, additional layer above and beyond the court itself. In contrast, 
a special corps of corporate monitor attorneys would have the potential to decrease costs 
by substituting a less costly style of lawyering for a more profit-oriented one. 
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original enthusiasm for the elegance of corporate law or for a business 
lawyer's legal practice serving managerial interests. A more general 
literacy about corporate law might be encouraged, and perhaps perspec-
tives from outside the corps of corporate management lawyers would be 
articulated with greater sophistication than general critics of corporate 
practice now muster. 
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